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/ An Analysis of
Japanese Foreign Policy Behavior: 1905 - 1941 /

by

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ABSTRACT

This study attempts to analyze Japanese foreign policy behavior in the 1905 - 1941 period. The two central themes explored in the analysis are lateral pressure and status inconsistency. To illustrate the themes the study draws upon diplomatic history and social psychology. The study is an exploratory one which offers a theoretical not empirical analysis although some operational measures are offered. A modest attempt is made to demonstrate how diplomatic history and social science, rather than being distinct fields of study, should be fused to achieve a fuller explanatory capability. Moreover the study also attempts, in an equally modest way, to explore the potential relevancy of social-psychology research to the study of international relations, specifically studies on the origins of war. Specifically the study is concerned with why Japan decided to enter the Second World War at the end of 1941. In general it is hoped that the ideas explored will in some way cast some light on the broader question 'why war'.

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INTRODUCTION

Two central, interwoven themes are developed and explored in this theoretical study. They are the themes of lateral pressure as developed by Nazli Choucri and Robert North¹, and status inconsistency for which the paper turns to Johan Galtung's² Structural Theory of Aggression.

The concepts of lateral pressure and status inconsistency and the manner in which they will be employed in this study will be discussed at length in the following chapter. It is enough to say here that they are used as explanatory tools to analyze Japanese foreign policy behavior in the 1905-1941 period including the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The study attempts to use a historical - social science approach to examine Japanese foreign policy during this period. The dual approach has been chosen out of a deep concern for the future of social science and its relationship with diplomatic history and it is hoped that in a modest way the usefulness of fusing the two can be demonstrated. The author does not believe that war is an accidental occurrence but rather that it is the result

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1. N. Choucri, R. C. North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence.
 2. J. Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression" in Journal of Peace Research, 11 (1964) p. 95-119.

of a number of interrelated factors acting together to make war a possible, although not inevitable, outcome. If war is not accidental then we must assume that there are certain discernable patterns of behavior in the relations among nations and diplomatic history is helpful in discovering such patterns and by providing insights into the relative importance of certain factors in given circumstances.

The historical laboratory can provide what is lacking in a strict social scientific approach. It can provide the deliberative process of government and hence the fusion of the two fields may result in a much fuller explanatory capability. Diplomatic history may provide insights into the problems social scientists seek to explain. That is, how did Japanese decision-makers perceive Japan's role in Asia and the world during this period? How did they perceive Japan's status in the community of nations? What was their perception of the status accorded Japan by the other great powers? Social Science, on the other hand can be used to provide the means to determine the relative explanatory weight of these and other factors, and their relationship to others.

To attempt to cover almost forty years of history in a paper of this length no doubt would strike the historian as a rather absurd ambition. The paper however attempts only to use history not write it. It is concerned with

particular historic events (U.S. intervention in the Portsmouth Treaty, the Paris Peace Conference, the Washington Conference, the U.S. 1924 Immigration Act to the freezing of Japanese assets in July 1941) and the Japanese perception of these events and Japan's reaction to them.

There exists however a tendency among social scientists searching for the causes of war to be hesitant, indeed reluctant, to consider factors which do not easily lend themselves to measurement. And while perhaps understandable such reluctance may also be detrimental to the development of social science explanation. The introduction of a cultural and/or a psychological factor tends to have disturbing effect upon social scientists, who are, for instance, fairly comfortable with factors such as population, technology and resource needs when dealing with a nation's foreign expansion. But what about the less tangible factors such as culture, relative deprivation or frustration? They raise not only serious questions of measurement but also of definition! If, however, we ignore such factors in a theoretical study we may well be guilty of simply "looking where there is the most light". Because of the problems of measurement and definition, there exists also the very human concern that a study which attempts to grapple with them may be considered less than sophisticated. Nevertheless, if social scientists are convinced that the more we

know about war and its causes the better able are we to prevent it, then surely it is worth both the effort and risk if such factors are discovered to be in any way helpful to explanation and prediction. A little humility is essential in any scientific endeavor for the latter involves a process of building and refinement.

For instance, the phenomena of particular interest to Johan Galtung are largely treated theoretically, not empirically and with a minimum of attention paid to problems of operationalization and definition. However a scanning of recent literature reveals that other scholars have noted the usefulness of his ideas and have built upon them.

The laboratory of history indicates that factors such as culture and the psychological effects of status inconsistency appear at least to be helpful in understanding the foreign policy behavior of Japan in the period under investigation. Writing in 1938, during the Sino-Japanese war, Japanese historian Tatsuo Kawai, for example, explained Japanese expansion as the manifestation of musubi - a philosophical concept relating to cosmic force which unites divergent elements and fosters growth. He viewed, as did many others, Japanese expansion as a cultural destiny and claimed that politically Japan had inevitably assumed the role of the major stabilizing force in East Asia while

culturally she had emerged as the pioneer of a new oriental civilization, a new order in East Asia.³

Kawai is introduced here only to support the contention that there exists in the historical laboratory sufficient evidence to convince the author that the cultural factor possesses an explanatory capability worthy of consideration in this study. The idea is accorded a fuller treatment in the following chapter where it emerges as a means of linking the two themes.

The study then does not employ a single factor approach but tries to link several factors in a theoretical treatment. The single factor approach nevertheless has played a dominant role in social science studies of the causes of war when social science should instead be working toward the development of theoretical frameworks capable of subsuming as many relevant factors as possible and determining the strength of their interrelationship.

An examination of social science literature dealing with the causes of war reveals an abundance of single factor approaches, among them imperialism, power struggles, protection of trade routes, arms races, inherent aggressiveness, but they are not integrated into a single framework. While no doubt relevant to the study of the causes of war these factors used individually suffer from

3. Tatsuo Kawai, The Goal of Japanese Expansion, p. 63.

an inadequate explanatory capability, characteristic of the single factor approach.

To cite one example we would surely have to question the explanatory value of the power politics model and the singular use of the concept of power to answer the question why international violence. This particular model is doubly troublesome, first because it is a single factor approach and secondly because it contains the notion of inherent aggressiveness (in the ethological sense). It therefore assumes that man must be deterred through the aggressive postures of others or through some kind of balancing device. Thus by positing aggression as a primary condition orthodox power theory not only justifies defensive postures through increased arms buildups but also justifies war as a legitimate instrument of policy. One can of course argue that history has shown most states to be aggressive, but one may also argue that few have questioned the premise from which the assumption of aggression stems, i.e., a primary or secondary source. This study contends that aggression is a secondary condition (i.e., has external sources) and thus corrected by means other than war. One need only look to the record military budget sought by the Ford administration for an appreciation of the durability of the power model.

The concept of power is perhaps most often associated with Hans J. Morgenthau who appears to use the concept to mean an actor's capacity to resolve future conflict in its favor (although the concept suffers from a multiplicity of definitions). Power is acquired through the use of force where the actor gains the elements of power, i.e., economic resources, territory, strategic control and so on. That is, the state seeks to gain maximum power by using the minimum of force.⁴

Theories of imperialism, especially those of Lenin, Hobson and Schumpeter also occupy a leading role in the study of the causes of war, but they too suffer from the defects of the single factor approach. For instance, one could focus on Schumpeter's theory of elite position and war to explain Japan's decision for war. That is an elite whose governing position depends on the preparation for and participation in war. Depending on which school of historical thought one belongs to, such a theory would not necessarily appear inconsistent with the Japanese case. That is, a military elite created by one war and active in bringing about another. However, it would be difficult to apply the same single factor approach to the German case (in the World War II case) where the elite which

4. See especially H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.

embarked on WW II assumed power in peace time?

The corpus of literature on the causes of war is voluminous and this digression obviously is not intended as a review. The intention was rather to call attention to the explanatory inadequacy of a single factor approach and the need for more multi-dimensional approaches to the phenomenon.

In reference to Schumpeter the notion of 'schools of historical thought' was introduced - a subject which requires some elaboration here. Obviously not all historians view the outbreak of the Pacific War in the same light and so there exist differing schools of thought in response to the question why. It is equally evident that since this study attempts to interpret historical events during the 1905-41 period in accordance with a particular theoretical framework that it would be drawn more to one school than another. Adherence to the 'traditional' school with its emphasis on the aggressiveness, in the normative sense, of Japanese foreign policy after 1931, the pre-war aims of a military elite, ultranationalism, or civilian-military rivalry, for instance would be inconsistent with what has been said in previous pages.

On the other hand the author is not a historian but rather a social scientist attempting to use, not write,

history to develop the explanatory capability of a social science theory. Hence, no pretence is made of having read all the historical evidence relating to this period nor to have an intimate knowledge of the works of the many historians writing in this area. However, one must at least be aware of which historical school best fits the model and hence it would appear essential to review briefly the historians' debate centered on the issue of responsibility.

To this end the paper discerns three very broad categories or schools of thought; the traditionalist; the revisionist; and the reconciliationist.

Because of the role played in both domestic and foreign affairs by the Japanese military, members of the traditionalist school in particular have devoted a great deal of time and detail to the activities of the Japanese military. To a great extent this school draws on the records of the Tokyo war crimes trial and the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings. What emerges in the traditional interpretation of the origins of the war is a picture of a Japanese conspiracy led by a military clique to dominate East Asia. The military is viewed as having embarked upon a program of terror, conspiracy

and political assassination, especially after 1931, to seize power. Thus, Japan's aggressive foreign policy after 1931 is viewed as the basic cause of the War. The traditionalist view is perhaps best personified in Herbert Feis, The Road To Pearl Harbor which remains one of the standard works of this school.

In general, the post war revisionist school has devoted its energy to assigning a blanket blame for the war to President Roosevelt. The President, some revisionists contend, purposefully precipitated the attack on Pearl Harbor by deliberately exposing the U.S. Pacific fleet. The U.S. could then enter the war on the side of the allies and promote Roosevelt's political ambitions. The most prominent adherents to this particular view are brought together in Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (1953) edited by Professor H. E. Barnes. In summarizing the book, which contains articles by W. H. Chamberlain, Percy Greaves, G. Morgenstern, C. C. Tansill, W. L. Neumann and others, Barnes states that:

The net result of revisionist scholarship applied to Pearl Harbor boils down essentially to this: In order to promote Roosevelt's political ambitions and his mendacious foreign policy some three thousand American boys were quite needlessly butchered⁵

5. H. E. Barnes (ed) Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, p. 651.

These members of the revisionist school, or this branch of the revisionist school, clearly assign the 'war guilt' to President Roosevelt - and they tend to focus almost exclusively on the events of the final year before Pearl Harbor.

One of the more interesting contributions to the book is made by W. L. Neumann who emphasizes the order by Roosevelt to freeze all Japanese assets in the U.S. in July, 1941. Neumann contends that this action left Japan with only two choices, i.e., surrender to U.S. demands, or go to war in order to gain the resources necessary for her survival as a great power.

While I do not feel that the outbreak of the war can be attributed to any one specific act, I do feel that Neumann raises an interesting point touching on the progressive elimination, over a period of time, of options acceptable to Japan. Elsewhere Neumann has also made the point that in the 1913-1917 period President Wilson's highly held standards of international morality were often waived in U.S. dealings with China and other parts of the globe but applied rigidly and without insight when dealing with Japan.⁶

Three other historians who represent a different branch of the revisionist school and on whom this paper relies substantially are Royama Masamichi, Akira Iriye and Ian Nish.

6. William L. Neumann, America Encounters Japan. Because of the time period covered in this book Neumann represents somewhat of a deviant case within the revisionist school described above.

Professor Royama argues that U.S. policy makers failed to correctly understand the signs of change in post war East Asia and slighted the significance of Japan's cultural and industrial growth during the war creating an unfavorable Japanese perception of the status accorded Japan by the powers.⁷ Such a reading, Royama says, led to a short sighted, coercive diplomatic strategy being directed against Japan, thus imposing unrealistic restrictions on her freedom to develop East Asia.

Akira Iriye examines the ideological and psychological estrangement of the United States and Japan. Iriye interprets the decade of the twenties in terms of a U.S. attempt to establish a new international order in East Asia based on co-operation. However, he argues that the proposed system never came to fruition and hence a new framework failed to arise to replace the old pre-war imperialistic framework. The powers he says were unable and unwilling to co-operate when it involved their respective national interests.

In his work Iriye examines the relationship between the domestic and foreign policies of the major powers in Asia, the Far East, China, Russia, Japan and the United States.⁸ Unlike the traditional school, Iriye rejects the

7. Royama Masamichi, The Foreign Policy of Japan: 1914-1939 Written only months before the outbreak of the war this book is a remarkably perceptive account.

8. See especially Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American East-Asian Relations and idem After Imperialism: The Search For A New Order In The Far East.

view that Japanese action in China was the root cause of the Pacific War. Rather he argues that it was the Japanese decision in 1938 to move into southeast Asia that brought Japan and the U.S. into conflict. He focuses on the connection between Japanese policy in China and in southeast Asia explaining that Japan needed the resources of southeast Asia in order to win the China War. Once the China war was brought to a successful conclusion, Iriye contends, additional forces would be released for southward expansion. Iriye contends that Japanese decision-makers recognized the risks involved in moving into southeast Asia but decided they were necessary risks to secure needed resources. In the Iriye account the U.S. adopted a stronger stand opposing Japan's efforts to establish a new order in Asia after 1938. The U.S., Iriye argues, viewed British and American security as interdependent and felt that Japanese expansion would ultimately mean the destruction of Britain's position in Asia thereby weakening British security. Iriye describes U.S. policy during 1940-41 as based on the view that strong action was the only way to halt Japanese expansion.

Ian Nish may also be placed in this school primarily because of his work on the period of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Traditionally the alliance is viewed either as naturally advantageous, or greatly favoring Japan.

Nish however weighs the balance in favor of Great Britain who valued the alliance as long as it was to her benefit to do so, ending it and opting for greater U.S. friendship at the Washington Conference. The Japanese role in the alliance Nish argues removed a good deal of the British burden of colonial protection.⁹

The leading figure identified with the 'reconciliation' school is James B. Crowley. Although he clearly challenges the generalizations of the traditionalist school, Professor Crowley's main task appears to be that of reconciling divergent viewpoints.¹⁰

In part at least the study of Japanese foreign policy during the 1905-1941 period is a study of competing elites and shifts in the conduct, if not substance, of Japanese foreign policy may be linked with the rise and fall of these elites. While no attempt has been made to provide a detailed account of the activities of competing elites, included in appendix form is an elite typology and the particular policies supported by the respective elites.

9. See especially Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 and idem Alliance in Decline: A Study In Anglo-Japanese Relations: 1908-23.

10. See especially Crowley, Japan's Quest For Autonomy, National Security and Foreign Policy 1930-1938.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this study an act is defined as aggressive if:

- a) as a consequence of the act another actor(s) suffers a physical, political, economic or social injury, and;
- b) the injury is not accidental, i.e., the first actor proceeds with the act even though he is aware that another actor(s) will be injured.

Within the framework of this definition Japanese foreign policy behavior during the period under investigation is said to exhibit varying degrees of aggressiveness, with the attack on Pearl Harbor constituting the ultimate aggressive act.

The term aggression of course has both a normative and an analytical meaning and in this paper the term is used only in the analytical sense. The approach used in the paper distinguishes it from the orthodox power theory school of social science by positing aggression as a secondary condition corrected by means other than war or defensive positions; and from the traditionalist historical school by looking for the roots of Japan's aggressiveness in policies pursued by other powers toward Japan. Japanese policy is viewed as the pursuit of legitimate national aims by leaders of the Japanese government, both civilian and military, which at times may be analytically labelled aggressive. The central question to

be explored is why Japan behaved aggressively and having rejected the notion of aggression as a primary condition other sources must be probed.

The first, and most obvious, step in this direction is to gather the 'known factors'. For instance after 1905 Japan entered a period of unprecedented economic development, i.e., a process involving the increase of a country's real national income over a period of time. (The term economic development is used here to imply the operation of certain forces embodying certain changes in certain variables). The period after 1905 may be called Japan's industrial revolution.

Diplomatic and economic history reveal an expansionary tendency given these conditions especially if the nation is resource poor, to meet new demands which the above process gives rise to.

During the 1905-1941 period Japan exhibits a tendency to act aggressively; during the same period she experiences considerable economic growth and she expands her activities beyond her national boundaries. Also known is the fact that Japan was not acting alone, i.e., other countries also were expanding often in the same direction.

The very existence of these factors begs the question of their possible interrelationships. Such a theoretical examination is encouraged further by the Choucri and North work and by the existence of a body of social-

psychological evidence suggesting that aggression is a secondary condition unlikely to occur unless stimulated by some external force.

The notion of an economically growing but resource poor nation striving to meet new consumer demands resorting to aggressive acts when its access to resources is restricted, is very appealing and would appear to offer a satisfactory explanation in the Japanese case. But, when one turns to the historical laboratory a question about the nature of the demands to be satisfied arises. That is, can Japan's foreign policy behavior during this period be explained solely in terms of the attempt to satisfy new consumer demands and the consequences of this quest - or was there another kind of demand which it also sought to satisfy, and if so what were the consequences.

There is sufficient historical evidence to point to a two-pronged demand structure. One was the need for free access to resources to satisfy new consumer demands; the other was for equality of treatment among the great powers - which would of course allow access to resources to meet the first demand - but which was also a prerequisite for the fulfillment of another objective - the leadership of Asia. Such a quest was perceived as Japan's duty, a duty bestowed upon her by her superior cultural heritage.

If then equality of treatment was a steadfast demand, the question arises what would be the consequences (aggressive potential) if Japan had (1) been accorded consistently full equality; (2) had never been accorded equality among the great powers; (3) was accorded equality of treatment but on an inconsistent basis. Social-psychological evidence points to the latter situation as holding the greatest potential for aggression. That is, the idea of giving with one hand and taking away with the other may give rise to a state of frustration and sense of relative deprivation for which aggression is a possible response. Hence the rationale for the attempt to integrate two theoretical works, i.e., lateral pressure and status inconsistency.

As developed by Choucri and North the concept of lateral pressure is used in reference to the process of foreign expansion in the form of any activity. This activity may range from missionary activity to resource extraction, and their primary concern is with the conflict generated by the process of expansion by two or more powers. The authors of the controversial work cite as the 'tap roots' of large scale violence increasing populations, growing levels of technology¹¹ and the search for access to resources. That is,

11. I have some difficulty with their use of the term technology to describe growth and prefer as mentioned to use the term economic development. However, rather than engage in terminological substitutions the term technology will be used here - but in the sense of economic development defined earlier.

an increase in demand for basic resources is associated with an increase in population and demands are said likely to increase as technology alters a society's perception of its needs. However if demands are not met and existing capabilities (domestic resources) are unable to meet them, new capabilities may have to be developed. But, they contend, a society can develop these capabilities (including resources) only if it has the necessary capabilities to do so.

Such is not inconsistent with nor difficult to apply to the Japanese case. After the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese war Japan entered a period of unprecedented economic growth accompanied by a continuing increase in population. New demands were generated, arable land, because of population increases, was becoming a scarce commodity, new investment channels were sought by the commercial sector, further resources were needed to support and maintain a new, higher standard of living. If these demands were to be met Japan as a resource poor nation would have to expand her activities beyond her borders. As a result of two wars (1894-95; 1904-05) Japan also possessed the potential (economic and military) to develop additional capabilities. According to Choucri and North, demand plus capability (above some threshold) equals a favorable predisposition to exert lateral pressure.

It is important to note that the authors also contend that lateral pressure may be associated with a desire

for national security and prestige given the contention of a two-pronged motivation for expansion. Just as Japan possessed sufficient capability to exert lateral pressure to satisfy consumer demand she too possessed the capability to acquire further capability (resources) to give future practical effect to her role as the leader of Asia.

According to the Choucrist and North framework there is a tendency, as a state expands its interests, for leaders and/or citizenry to feel that these 'national interests' have to be protected. Again this well fits the Japanese case. Viscount Ishii, Japan's foreign minister in 1915, confirmed Japan's need to protect her 'national interests' in Manchuria when he explained that:

... the increase of our population, the congestion of our country, and our lack of raw materials are such that Manchuria, with its virgin soil and immense resources, has come to be regarded as our vital protection. We do not necessarily mean to promote mass emigration to Manchuria; rather we shall foster our industries by utilizing the raw materials which we can obtain there ... given unobstructed access to those resources we may still hope to solve our population problem.¹²

Furthermore Choucrist and North contend that when two or more major powers engage in lateral pressure their respective interests in all probability will be opposing and that the activities of these nations may collide.

12. Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, in Foreign Policies of The Powers, p. 116.

Certainly this is true in the Japanese case where Japan's interests clearly were opposed to and collided with British interests especially in the Yangtse Valley area prior to World War I and the South Pacific and with U.S. and Russian interests as well.

If, the authors contend, a nation finds itself at a relative disadvantage in the competition for resources, markets, prestige, it may try to improve its position and potential through alliances, with strong powers (as did Japan with Great Britain, France, Russia and later with Germany and Italy). But, alliances have their price, i.e., if alliance partners are also competitors there may develop mutual suspicions and mutual antagonism. Again this is not inconsistent with the Japanese case, especially when one examines the accounts of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided by Ian Nish and M. D. Kennedy where conflict of interest, growing suspicions and estrangement is well documented.

In summary then Choucri and North contend that major wars often result from a two-fold process: 1) internally generated pressures, mutual comparison¹³, competition, rivalry and 2) conflict on a number of salient dimensions.

13. The notion of mutual comparison will be developed further in the following pages.

"Each of these processes", they say, "is closely related to the other and can be accounted for to a remarkable degree by the interaction among three variables: population, technology, and access to resources."

From the Choucri and North work a partial explanation of Japanese foreign policy behavior may be gained. To supplement what has been drawn from the lateral pressure model the paper turns to the body of literature on the concept of status inconsistency. The volume of research in this area is considerable and may even be traced to Max Weber.¹⁴ However an initial and more fundamental discussion of the concept and its possible consequences is found initially in an article by E. Benoit-Smullyan published in 1944.¹⁵ Since that time a number of scholars have investigated the subject linking it to observable processes. From a brief survey of this body of literature it is possible to extract an axiomatic structure representative of a broad spectrum of the research in this area.¹⁶ Such a construction seems preferable to listing specific extractions by author and work and is presented as follows:

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14. See for example: H. Gerth, C. W. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.
 15. E. Benoit-Smullyan, "Status Types and Status Interrelationships" in American Sociological Review, (1944) p. 151-161.
 16. Such a review would include for example: Benoit-Smullyan, 1944: Barber, 1955: Cartwright & Harary, 1956: Heider, 1958: Lipset, 1960: Berger, Cohen, Snell, Zelditch, 1962: Galtung, 1964: Kimberly, 1966: and more recently of course, Singer, East, Rummel, Small, Wallace and several others.

1. There exists an international social system in which nation-states are the primary actors and the system, like all social systems, is a stratified one.

Stratification is defined by Galtung as meaning that "elements within a system will be ranked according to a number of criteria which evaluate (determine) their position in the system."¹⁷ By viewing nation states as the component parts of the international system then we are dealing with an interaction system which in Galtungian terms is "a multidimensional system of stratification, where those who have and those who have not, those who have more and those who have less, find, are given, or are forced into their positions."

2. The members of a given social system¹⁸ agree on the weights to be given criteria by which they evaluate themselves and others.
3. If standing on a given criterion does not make any difference to the overall standing in the social system (S) then it is not an evaluation or rank in S.¹⁹

17. Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", in Journal of Peace Research, (1964), p. 97.

18. In this study the great powers are assumed to be sufficiently interdependent directly or indirectly to be treated as a discernable subsystem within the larger international system.

19. See for example Morris Zelditch, Jr. & Bo Anderson, "On the Balance of a Set of Ranks," in Berger, Zelditch, Anderson (eds) Sociological Theories in Progress, p. 244-268.

4. Rank is important because interaction is rank dependent, i.e., a state's behavior in the system and the behavior of others toward it will be a reflection of its rank in the system.²⁰
5. Balanced ranks²¹ or equilibrated positions tend to be stable.
6. Imbalanced ranks, or disequilibrated positions tend to change or try to change, until their ranks are balanced.
7. The status discrepant actor will use as a reference group another which is not imbalanced in the same way and the comparison will be upward.
8. Actors in social positions of rank disequilibrium desire upward mobility to balance their ranks.
9. Interference with the discrepant actors mobility tends to produce a state of tension. The form of tension varies and may be described phenomenologically as frustration, relative deprivation or resentment.

20. See for example Galtung, *ibid* and J. C. Kimberly in Sociological Theories.

21. A rank is defined as any value on any criterion with a non-zero weight in S or any function of a combination of such values.

10. Any member of any given social system evaluates itself at least as highly as do its "significant others".

The point here of course is that if any member of a social system holds a low opinion of himself or evaluates his position less positively than other members of the same social system then differential or derogatory treatment likely would not have a disturbing effect. ²²

Having presented an axiomatic structure as representative of a substantial body of literature on status inconsistency the study now narrows its focus to a specific theoretical treatment of the subject. Johan Galtung's Structural Theory of Aggression provides a sound theoretical, not empirical, treatment of status inconsistency and is consistent with the axiomatic structure presented. While this study treats status inconsistency in a much different and much more literal sense than does Galtung his theory provides the base from which it proceeds with some modification.

22. See for example. Berger, Cohen, Snell, Zelditch, 1962: & Zelditch & Anderson, 1966.

Galtung's structural theory of aggression deals with the criteria of rank in terms of two positions only - complete Topdog (T) and complete Underdog (U), or high and low. These are equilibrated positions (i.e., TTTT & UUUU) "since the ranks of the elements in these (topdog & underdog) positions are in equilibrium with each other; they are equivalents." ²³

The theoretical problem to which he addresses himself is where in the social system, for what social types, is aggression most likely to accumulate and express itself. "For common sense as well as social experience make us doubt that aggression is randomly distributed on the configurations or social positions." ²⁴

In his theoretical exploration of the relationship between the degree of rank disequilibrium and the level of aggressive behavior Galtung is explicit that he is referring to relative not absolute positions, stating that:

... absolute positions are of paramount importance only in systems with little or no interaction or in extreme cases (e.g. below subsistence level). With a high level of interaction, we know of nothing in social science literature to disprove the idea that concern about relative position on a rank dimension will increase ... ²⁵

23. Galtung, *ibid*, p. 97.

24. *Ibid*, p. 97.

25. *Ibid*, p. 97.

In attempting to locate in the social structure the maximum possibility of aggression against other actors Galtung excludes the one dimensional rank (TTTTT & UUUUU) and one dimensional downward and upward mobility as a suitable basis for explanation. Instead he focuses on rank disequilibrium as a sufficient condition for aggression. The complete topdog, he says, is satisfied with his position and the complete underdog lacks the resources necessary for aggression. According to Galtung what the underdog does not have, he can get, "but he gets it we believe precisely by changing one of his U statuses into a T status and correcting that status into a resource for the dissolution of his disequilibrium." ²⁶

From the differences between the social situations of the TU and the UU Galtung states that disequilibrium means three things:

- 1) Differential Treatment: - i.e., the TU is more likely to use a TT as his reference group than he is to use a UU; i.e., he desires upward mobility.
- 2) Resources: - high ranks on some dimensions will provide the disequilibriated unit with resources to correct the U dimensions into T's.

26. Ibid, p. 98.

3) Self-Righteousness: - balance of ranks is a more generally accepted norm than compensation. Galtung suggests that actor's tend to assert that "considering our high rank on X it is right and proper that we should also have a high rank on Y because that corresponds to what is due to us," and such claims will be based on achievement rather than on the lack of it (compensation).

Finally, the extreme form of aggression among nations is war, which Galtung says is unlikely unless all other means of gaining mobility have been attempted and thwarted and unless the actor has some past history of violent aggression.

Galtung's theory is logically and intuitively appealing but requires some modification to give it a greater explanatory capability and more general application. For the purposes of this study the major target of modification (from which other areas branch) is Galtung's strict adherence to the two dimensional category of T and U. Within the Galtungian framework (which is consistent in this regard with much of the literature*) an actor is allowed to be only either a T or a U on any given dimension. Any upward movement then must be from a U to a T which appears a rather drastic transition. Nevertheless it is all that is available within a framework which does not allow for movement within a T or U status, i.e., U+ or T- for instance. If we allow for this kind of movement then it is possible to examine the possibility of status inconsistency along a single status dimension, in this case an international prestige dimension, where equality of treatment is assumed to be an indicator of prestige.

One of the problems here is a lack of indicators in social science literature with which international prestige may be measured. A single indicator of this dimension (e.g., diplomatic representation) does not seem adequate. To explore the possibility of inconsistent status treatment along a single status dimension one would have to develop

* Status inconsistency normally refers to a situation in which the actor is evaluated highly in one respect and lowly in another.

several indicators - for prestige for instance. In addition to diplomatic representation, invitations to world and/or regional conferences, nations with which the particular country is allied and how, and so on appear to be valuable indicators. This would facilitate exploration of the possible consequences of inconsistent status treatment along a single dimension and avoid the simplistic and deterministic T vs. U dichotomy.

A nation could, both in its own perception and that of other great powers (cf axioms 2 & 10) possess overall Topdog status while at the same time suffering inconsistent status treatment on a single dimension. For example, an Oriental nation could be extended diplomatic representation identical to that accorded to and by other members of the great power club; be invited on an equal basis to conferences attended by other great powers; be an equal alliance partner of one or more great powers; but perhaps because of a cultural bias be subject to differential immigration policy treatment. If the only indicator of international prestige was immigration policy then surely the Oriental nation would be assigned a U along this dimension. But, if two or more indicators are used some type of aggregate score is necessary and the result is neither a T nor a U on this particular dimension but rather something along the lines of a T- score designating

inconsistency along a single dimension.

This study, in considering what would constitute an international prestige dimension, includes such themes as racial equality and immigration policies toward Japan; alliance treatment; invitations to and treatment at conferences; naval position, i.e., ratio of naval build-up; and response of other great powers to Japanese territorial expansion. The modesty of this work has already been stipulated and hence these indicators are not definitive in the sense that they are said to be the only ones which should be considered nor even necessarily the correct ones. They are however themes which emerge from the historical laboratory and which appear helpful in understanding Japanese foreign policy in the 1905-1941 period. But this study is less concerned with developing operational measures than with the development of a theoretical framework within which to explore the problem.

One could then explore the possibility of an actor accorded overall Topdog (i.e., TTTT) status but where the status accorded the actor by others within the same system on a single status dimension tends to fluctuate, i.e., to be literally inconsistent. The inconsistency would not be posited as T vs. U, but as inconsistent in the sense of fluctuating between say T and T- or U and U+. To turn to

a concrete example one may cite the Russo-Japanese Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 at the end of the war between the two countries. Japan at this time was a member of the great power community and recognized as such. In 1905 her equality of position was demonstrated when she was allowed to conduct a bilateral treaty in which she as the victor demanded certain spoils. On the other hand, the United States intervened in these negotiations depriving Japan of certain demands (indemnity payments). In assessing the status accorded Japan on an international prestige dimension then one could hardly assign a U because she was allowed to conduct a bilateral treaty symbolic of her great power status. On the other hand, it would be equally difficult to assign a T because a third power intervened in the negotiations to the detriment of Japan. It would appear more realistic to assign a T- status score.

Obviously some kind of weighting procedure would have to be devised to determine the relative importance of each status dimension, but assuming that this particular kind of inconsistency is found to be accorded along a status dimension, considered to be of the greatest importance to the actor, along a status dimension which the actor feels is a determinant of its freedom of action in the particular social system. It would then seem reasonable to assume that inconsistency of this nature could produce a highly

frustrating situation and the perception of relative deprivation for which aggression is a possible response. The possibility arises when we reach into the historical laboratory and find it imprecise to rank Japan as a complete underdog (UUUUU) or in a social position of rank disequilibrium (e.g., TTTUU) as posited by Galtung. Rather Japan appears to best fit in the topdog category yet suffering from inconsistent status treatment on a single status dimension - an international prestige dimension - indicative of equality of treatment. Drawing from diplomatic history it can be clearly demonstrated that Japan assigned great importance to equality of treatment among the great powers. Viscount Ishii provided an insight into the essence of nature of this equality when he wrote that Japan sought equality "not in the absolute sense that Japan should never fall behind any Power on earth in terms of wealth, national resources, nor military strength;" but rather that Japan be treated as an equal among her equals - the great powers - and "not be the subject of discriminatory or derogatory treatment by nations with whom she interacts." ²⁷

There exists sufficient historical evidence to

27. Ishii, Foreign Policies, p. 102.

demonstrate that Japan was subjected to this particular kind of inconsistent status treatment on a fairly regular basis over a period of time (1905-1941) to warrant exploring the psychological effects of this kind of status inconsistency. Equally convincing is the fact that there exists a substantial body of social-psychology research which posits aggression as a possible response to a frustrating situation.²⁸ So, the question to be explored theoretically is to what extent Japanese aggression can be explained in terms of this kind of status inconsistency.

There are, of course, problems encountered in making this transition not the least of which centers around the notion of the tendency to compare. There is a good deal of agreement in the literature that the tendency to compare originates not in either of the equilibrated positions but rather with the disequilibrated units. There is however considerable debate concerning where in the spectrum of disequilibrated (i.e., TUUUU - TTTTU) the tendency to compare originates. The notion is an important one since the tendency to compare is said to activate the balancing process.

But surely it is also possible for an actor to compare itself to others within the same social system and through the comparison assume the exercise of the same rights and privileges as those assumed by the other members. And

28. Social-Psychology research is discussed in the concluding chapter.

if these rights and privileges cannot be exercised on a regular basis because of inconsistent status treatment a frustrating situation may develop for which aggression is a possible consequence.

Some assistance may be gained here from James Kimberly who discerns two kinds of functions which may be performed within any social system. These are: 1) Universal functions, which are common to all positions within the system and 2) Special functions, which are common to only some positions within the system. Because universal functions are common to all positions they cannot require a degree of ability greater than that of the least members of the system. Special functions then would be performed by these actors possessing superior abilities - in this case the great powers.

Historically evidence demonstrates that Japan as a great power had the ability to perform these special functions, i.e., a leadership role in Asia similar to that of Britain in India and Africa and the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere. Performance of this 'special function' however required equality of treatment which the paper contends Japan received on an inconsistent basis and therefore was frustrated in her attempts to perform an Asian leadership role. Perception of this inconsistent treatment stems from

29. J. C. Kimberly, "A Theory of Status Equilibrium" in Sociological Theories.

outside interference with Japanese objectives. The inconsistent status treatment is said to create a frustrating situation and the possibility of aggression.

In summary, this theoretical study attempts to draw together within a single framework both lateral pressure and status inconsistency as complementary tools in developing an explanation for both the occurrence and varying levels of Japanese aggression during the 1905-1941 period. Japanese aggression is said to occur primarily over interference with the nation's access to resources beyond her national borders, and the frustration aroused by inconsistent status treatment. A two-pronged motivation is said to motivate the need for access to external resources: 1) the response of a resource poor nation to new consumer demands stemming from increased levels of economic development and population growth; and 2) the need for resources needed to perform a leadership role in Asia perceived to be both Japan's mission and her right as a great power. The two of course are interrelated in that the latter also responds to the demands of the former. While empirical testing of the posited relationships is not performed in this exploratory study some operational measures are suggested in the concluding chapter.

THE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Prelude to 1905

The period of modern Japanese diplomatic relations began with the Meiji restoration (1868) after 250 years of self-imposed isolation. Thereafter Japan's foreign policy in the main was directed toward the attainment of national security and equality with the great powers.³⁰ In the Meiji period emphasis was placed on the development of Japan's military and industrial strength to secure a position of equality and a defence capability to secure her position as an independent state free from Western encroachment. The quest for security and equality gains significance when attention is focused on how the objectives were to be given practical effect. During this period an explicit sense of cultural mission, cultural destiny also grew in Japan. It was a period during which, according to Tatsuo Kawai, Japan was:

... striving to bring about such conditions as will make it possible for Asiatic nations to unite in one Asiatic system and live an Asiatic life through mutual helpfulness ... viewed in the light of its historical precedents and character and also in the light of its cultural mission, expansion on the continent is the destiny of our race ... Japan is the pioneer of a new age; she is the hope of a new Asia ...³¹

30. See for example Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938; Royama Masumichi, The Foreign Policy of Japan, 1914-1939; Tatsuo Kawai, The Goal of Japanese Expansion.

31. Tatsuo Kawai, The Goal of Japanese Expansion, p. 16.

To this end Japanese foreign policy activity was aimed necessarily at her Asiatic neighbours and at the Western powers. Japan wanted her Asian neighbours to recognize her new position as a result of the Meiji Restoration. When internal disorders had been settled and progress had been made toward consolidating the new, modern state, Japan began negotiations with China and Korea to this end. On the other hand Japan also wanted the Western powers to abolish the 'unequal' treaties which stood in the way of her aspiration of gaining national equality with the great powers and which were detrimental to her economic development. Success in one direction was necessary for success in the other, as Royama points out:

... as long as the Western powers would not recognize the enhanced position of Japan among Asiatic nations, the latter would not acknowledge the great change in Japan's political order, nor its significant bearing upon international relations in the Far East.³²

The notion that Japan had a mission in Asia and that there would first be a 'growing period' during which the proper conditions of security and equality would be created becomes evident soon after the 'opening' of Japan. As early as 1887, in the rather Machiavellian Tani Memorial, the Japanese statesman, stated that having emerged from

32. Royama, Foreign Policy, p. 5.

isolation the Japanese must:

... make our country secure by military preparation ... encourage and protect our people at home and then wait for the time of confusion in Europe which must come eventually ... and although we have no immediate concern with it ourselves, we must feel it for such an event will agitate the nations of the Orient as well, and hence, although our country is not mixed up in the matter, so far as Europe is concerned, we may then become the chief nation of the Orient... It is therefore evident that we can seize the opportunity and obtain the balance of power in the East and thus compel others to esteem and fear us. In the same way we may stand with European countries.³³

Japan's military strength was in fact growing and in 1895 the nation emerged the victor from the Sino-Japanese War. The post-war Tripartite Intervention, which forced Japan to return the coveted Liaotung Peninsula to China breathed new life into the quest for security and equality and Japan's perceived role in Asia. Japanese decision-makers with renewed energy considered means of increasing Japan's power to ensure that she would not again suffer the humiliation caused by the Tripartite Intervention. In 1898 Prime Minister Okuma announced that Japan's superior position in Asia made it her duty "to protect China from Western aggression and to aid her in adopting political, social and economic reforms."³⁴ That same year the East Asia Common

33. Cited in T. Bennett, Americans In Eastern Asia, p. 322.

34. D. M. Brown, Nationalism in Japan: An Introductory Historical Analysis, p. 136.

Culture Society was formed in large part to espouse Japan's proper role in Asia. Composed of businessmen, politicians and nationalists the society stressed that Japan must save China from the 'predatory' Western powers.³⁵ The business community was also interested, as were Japan's political leaders, in developing new markets and more profitable trade with other Oriental nations as a result of Japan's post-war economic growth.* However, while Japanese leaders (whether in 1898 or 1938) do not deny the realities of lateral pressure, it was always fused with the notion of cultural benefit - thus distinguishing, in the Japanese mind, Western and Japanese processes of expansion. That is, while exerting lateral pressure Japan also claimed it was spreading spiritual and cultural benefits and developing not only Japan but all of Asia under Japanese leadership.³⁶

With the memory of the Tripartite Intervention still fresh and searching for ways of gaining equality, Japan concluded the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902.

The choice of alliance partners was largely determined by the direction of Japanese expansion. Germany and Russia were the dominant powers in north China while Britain and France were dominant in south and central China.³⁷

35. Ibid, p. 133.

* Statistical indicators of economic growth are provided in Appendix C.

36. This perception of the motive for Japanese expansion is clearly outlined in Tatsuo Kawai.

37. James Crowley, "Military Foreign Policies", in J. W. Morley (ed) Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868-1941; A Research Guide, p. 17.

The question for Japanese decision-makers was whether "Japan should buttress its commercial interest in the region opposite Taiwan or in Korea and Manchuria? The decision would determine whether Japan would seek an alliance with Great Britain or with Russia."³⁸ Both the Army and Navy General Staffs, albeit for different strategic reasons, regarded Korea as the key national defense issue. Moreover both services agreed that Russia posed the greatest threat to Japan's interests in Korea and South Manchuria. The combined strength of the Japanese army and navy was judged sufficient to face Russian forces in the Liaotung area but Japan was not in a position to challenge British naval power.³⁹ Thus, both General Staffs and eventually the genro favored an alliance with Britain over one with Russia. To Japanese leaders the alliance recognized the nation's membership in the community of nations as a great power and virtually removed the possibility of another incident similar to the Tripartite Intervention.⁴⁰

As Kennedy points out:

The Japanese viewed the alliance with a strong sense of pride and deep felt emotion. To them it marked the attainment of a prolonged effort to win recognition as an equal among the great powers of the West.⁴¹

38. Ibid, p. 17.

39. Ibid, p. 19.

40. More will be said of this alliance as the analysis progresses.

41. M. D. Kennedy, The Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan, p. 53.

National security remained a real concern however and Russian activity in Manchuria and Korea and her occupation of Liaotung area was regarded by Japanese leaders as a serious threat to the nation's security.⁴² Thus when negotiations proved fruitless Japan formally declared war on Russia in February 1904.

1905 - 1914

The Russo-Japanese War and the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905

The Russo-Japanese war initially provided Japan with a means to assert its control in Korea and to promote expansion in China but the result of the war also signalled the beginning of Japan's continentalism. In victory the Japanese had succeeded in eliminating Russian influence in Korea and South Manchuria. The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peking (1905) subsequently transferred the leased territory of Liaotung and the South Manchurian Railway to Japan thus giving the nation her first firm foothold on the continent. The victory greatly enhanced Japan's self-image and her world and regional position.

Japan had been to war before - with China ten years previous and had also been victorious, but the war with Russia was regarded differently. Japan had defeated

42. Brown, *ibid*, p. 131, Royama, p. 11.

a Western power and such an accomplishment was "heady wine for a nation that had long complained of unequal and unjust treatment at the hands of Western nations."⁴³ Not only had she defeated a Western power - but one which in the Japanese perception had, through its expansion program, threatened Japan's continental interests. In the Japanese view, the war had firmly established her equality of position among the great powers and she was now ready to assume the responsibilities, the rights and privileges of her position.

Commenting on the victory in Taiyo, Viscount Watanabe wrote that as a result of her victory Japan was:

... in a position to make a unique contribution to civilization ... (that) ... the Japanese were beginning to realize that they occupied a place of leadership in the 'Moral World' ...⁴⁴

Writing also in Taiyo, Okuma asserted that Japan should follow through on her naval and military victories with the economic exploitation of Korea and Manchuria.

The immediate post-war euphoria was short lived however as the United States intervened in the bilateral peace negotiations at Portsmouth to deprive Japan of some of the spoils of her victory. Available evidence suggests that Japanese leaders had not anticipated any outside objections

43. Brown, *ibid*, p. 143.

44. *Ibid*, p. 143.

to the negotiations.⁴⁵ The Japanese prepared for the peace conference as a great power who had shown by the defeat of Russia that she possessed the military, administrative and industrial ability worthy of that rank.⁴⁶

The United States however not only objected to Japan's post-war claim to Sakhalin Island but denied Japan a war indemnity payment to which she felt entitled. Japan acquiesced in face of the opposition but U.S. interference in a bilateral negotiations sparked the first anti-American demonstrations and riots in Japan. All sections of the press were unanimous in their denunciation of the 'humiliating' peace and in calling upon the government to resign and in calling on the emperor to refuse to ratify the treaty.⁴⁷

The intervention was not only humiliating but was also inconsistent with the treatment now accorded Japan as a great power. The ten years since the Sino-Japanese War had been a significant period in Japan's development. In 1900 she had participated side by side with the great powers in China to quell the Boxer uprising - an act which Iriye has said was symbolic of Japan's great power status.⁴⁸ In 1902, Japan's great power status and equality of position was recognized through the Anglo-Japanese alliance which

45. See for example Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations; also Royama, Tatsuo and Ishii.

46. Royama, *ibid*, p. 7.

47. Brown, p. 133.

48. Iriye, *ibid*, p. 86.

recognized her special interests in Korea and Manchuria. In 1903 she had received a 'war cost' loan from Rothschilds in London in preparation for the war with Russia.⁴⁹ Victory in the Russo-Japanese war had consolidated her great power status and she was allowed to conduct a bilateral peace treaty. Each of these events would indicate, in Galtungian terms, a T rank on an international prestige dimension. The U.S. intervention and derogatory action was inconsistent with the previous treatment and in fact was reminiscent of the powers' treatment of Japan in 1895.

The period after 1905 and the Portsmouth humiliation was marked by an increasing awareness among Japanese decision-makers and the citizenry that Japan was not considered and was not being treated as an equal among her 'equals' - the great powers, on a consistent basis. Victory in two wars, and an alliance with a great Western power had enabled Japan to fulfill her objective of entrance into the great power club but now her external relations were marred by Western suspicions and racial prejudice.

49. Brown, *ibid*, p. 134.

Several incidents in the 1905-1914 period were regarded by the Japanese as cultural slights and they began to question whether or not the nation was being treated as an equal among the great powers. Immigration policies toward Japan and the treatment of Japanese nationals in foreign lands made race a sensitive issue. Japan's decisive victory over Russia in 1905 and her consequent expansion had revived the 'Yellow Peril' movement in the United States, Germany and the British Dominions (e.g., the 'White Australia' Policy). The situation was described by Viscount Ishii as "seriously affecting Japan's position of equality vis-a-vis the Western world, in particular the United States and the British overseas dominions."⁵⁰ Aware, for instance, that the United States government was anxious to halt the immigration of Japanese laborers the status conscious nation concluded the so-called Gentleman's Agreement with the U.S. Under the terms of this agreement Japan volunteered to control the emigration of Japanese laborers if the U.S. did not adopt a specific exclusion statute. A similar agreement was reached with Canada. Recalling the event some years later Ishii explained that:

The basic principle of these agreements was that Japanese immigration should not be *openly* excluded by a discrimination law passed

50. Ishii, Foreign Policies, p. 105.

by a foreign country, but that Japan would voluntarily check the exodus of her subjects belonging to the working class... As far as the world in general was concerned ... Japan was still permitted to maintain a position of equality in the matter of emigration. Of course, such an equality was hardly more than a fiction... 51

The Yellow Peril movement, manifested by such incidents as the 1906 San Francisco School Board resolution excluding all Oriental children from the city's schools, was regarded in Japan as a cultural slight. "Yellow peril indeed," reads a defensive editorial in *Taiyo* in December, 1905, "... we could prove a Yellow blessing to the world." 52

Writing in 1905 Seiji Hishida expounded the Japanese perception of Western reaction stating that:

... Japan's activity in the Far East particularly with reference to the potential awakening of China ... has aroused the jealousy of rival powers. An attempt is made to create antagonism to her mission in China by invoking the apparition of the "Yellow peril" which is supposed to endanger Western civilization. 53

Nevertheless, Japan was determined to give her great power status practical effect through expansion in East Asia similar to the leadership roles assumed by Britain in Africa and India and the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Japan regarded such a role as her right as an equal among the great powers. The editor of *Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin* (Japan

51. Ishii, p. 105-106.

52. Brown, p. 151.

53. Seiji Hishida, The International Position of Japan as a Great Power, p. 261.

and the Japanese) in 1907 stated the Japanese perspective asserting that Western nations:

... have hitherto assumed unwarrantedly that the white races have a monopoly on all that is best connected with humanity and human institutions ... Europeans have considered themselves superior to all Asiatics ... Japan has begun to explode that theory. She must keep on doing it.⁵⁴

With a view toward consolidating her Manchurian position, her position among the powers, and to minimize the racial prejudice revived by the 1905 war, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was rewritten in 1905; the Franco-Japanese agreement of 1907 recognized each other's spheres of interest in East Asia, and Japan's sphere included Manchuria; the Russo-Japanese agreement, the same year, divided Manchuria between the two powers, and the Root-Takahira agreement in 1908 granted mutual U.S.-Japanese recognition of the status quo in the Pacific and Japan's adherence to the Open Door principle.

Each of these agreements testified to Japan's great power status and its recognition by the other great powers. Furthermore, as Ian Nish points out, the agreements signalled the two dimensions of Japan's position, i.e., as a world power and as a regional power.⁵⁵ The Anglo-Japanese Alliance enunciated Japan's role as a world power while the

54. Brown, p. 157.

55. Ian Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23, p. 20.

agreements with Russia and France defined her regional position in East Asia. The effect in each case was to confirm her great power status and equality among the powers and clearly a T would have to be assigned Japan on an international prestige dimension on this basis.

Yet despite these agreements and the alliance, immigration policies and the awareness of racial prejudice prompted many Japanese including Genro Ito Hirobumi to claim that Japan was not accepted as an equal. Ito in 1907 announced that he was "dismayed by the racial prejudice displayed by ... the United States," and that there was "an unmistakable trend toward Japanese isolation."⁵⁶ Ito's sense of Japan's isolation as a result of cultural prejudice was echoed in 1911 by Japanese author Tokutomi Soho who wrote that:

... despite alliances and ententes Japan was merely an isolated entity without any real friends ... There seemed to be no real value in international sympathy and understandings. Japan must henceforth be resolute and carry out what it believed to be in its interests, regardless of other nation's attitudes.⁵⁷

The signing of the Gentleman's Agreement had not ended Japan's troubles in this area. Despite a decline in Japanese immigration since 1908, California in 1913 passed

56. Iriye, *Across*, p. 114.

57. *Ibid*, p. 116.

a law prohibiting 'aliens ineligible for U.S. citizenship' from owning land. The new law was viewed by Ishii as "plainly discriminatory against the Japanese."⁵⁸ In Canada, that same year, the provinces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan forbid orientals to employ white women and girls. As a result, "indignation was caused in Japan where public opinion resented the action in a part of the Empire with which Japan was allied."⁵⁹ The Japanese ambassador at London Kato Takeaki immediately protested the matter to the British Foreign Office stressing the bitterness aroused in Japan by the discriminatory legislation. Kato protested to the British Foreign Office that "to single out Japanese for special restrictions was not fair, and was necessarily hurtful to their amour propre."⁶⁰

That same year the Canadian government decided to suspend all immigration, exclusive of the provisions of the Gentleman's Agreement for a six month period. This time the Japanese government delivered a strong note of protest to the British Foreign Office stating that:

The promulgation of the Canadian Revised Immigration Regulations (regardless of their being of a temporary or of a general nature) by which a part of the said understanding should be infringed, and which should be regarded as including the Japanese among the immigrants to be prohibited from entering Canada, will undoubtedly have the ill-effect of arousing public opinion in Japan which

58. Ishii, Foreign Policies, p. 106.

59. Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911-1915: A Study of British Far Eastern Policy, p. 279.

60. *Ibid*, p. 279.

would lead to undesirable results detrimental to the cordial relations between Japan and Great Britain. 61

This inconsistent status treatment, i.e., the giving of equality with one hand (alliances and agreements) and taking it away with the other (immigration policies) created an increasingly frustrating situation in Japan. That is the powers were recognizing Japan as a great power on the world stage, an equal, but not allowing her to rationalize her status on a regional basis as the leader of Asia, thus depriving her of a role Japan perceived to be her right, as Britain and the U.S. enjoyed elsewhere in the world.

Immigration policies were not the only indicator of inconsistent treatment by the Powers. For instance, Britain stood by her ally by refusing to allow a British firm to construct, at China's request in 1907, a railway from Hsimnitung to Fakumen which would have unfairly competed with Japanese rail lines in Manchuria. On the other hand, Japan was excluded from the financial consortium (made up of great Western powers responsible for loans to China to assist in her modernization) when it was set up in 1910. Exclusion from the consortium and the operations of the powers was perceived as a status slight by the Japanese.

61. Ibid, p. 281.

"Japan felt deprived and was resentful of the actions of those powers, especially Britain and France whose political partner she was." ⁶²

The same year the United States began what Nish regards as the process of forcing Britain to make a choice between Japan and the United States by arguing for the conclusion of an arbitration treaty between the two Western powers. Great Britain however was concerned lest such a treaty conflict with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and hence extended an invitation to Japan to join in the proposed arbitration treaty. Japan however perceived the reality of the alliance differently in 1910 than in 1902 and seriously questioned Britain's role in the event of a U.S.-Japanese conflict. Any amendment to the alliance to relieve Britain of responsibility to Japan in case of U.S.-Japanese hostilities was in the Japanese perception "merely to state formally what was recognized as the existing situation."⁶³ Japan thus rejected the invitation and her grounds for rejection further indicate that Japan perceived a cultural bias on the part of Western powers. While refusing to attend on the grounds that "the fate of the state should not be subordinated to arbitration" Japan also claimed that:

62. Nish, *ibid*, p. 43.

63. *Ibid*, p. 43.

... if Japan entered into the suggested treaty, there was the danger, since the majority of arbitrators would be Europeans and Americans, that she would stand in an unfavorable position from the point of view of cultural differences, of race and religion.⁶⁴

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed for the second time in 1911 and while the existence of the alliance remained indicative of Japan's status as a world power Britain refused to extend the terms of the alliance to recognize Japan's special rights beyond the Korean frontier. In renewing the alliance however Britain did publicly recognize Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910. Again Japan was the victim of inconsistent treatment. Britain, while recognizing the annexation of Korea was also refusing to recognize Japan's perceived right to extend her regional supremacy, and Japanese politicians expressed deep dissatisfaction with the treaty.⁶⁵

Shortly after the renewal of the alliance its terms regarding co-operation were seriously questioned with the Chinese revolution in October 1911. Although anxious not to see a republic created in China, Japan refrained from active interference at British insistence.⁶⁶ However

64. Ibid, p. 43 exchange between Japanese Foreign Minister Komura and Japanese ambassador to Britain Kato.

65. Nish, p. 81.

66. Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, p. 80.

British officials in China arranged an armistice between the government and the revolutionaries, and a Republic was declared in February, 1912. The Japanese Diet regarded this development as testifying to the complete failure of Japan's diplomacy and the Saionji ministry resented Britain's role in the revolution and the creation of the republic.⁶⁷ The Japanese press also reacted with hostility towards Britain accusing her of bad faith under the terms of the alliance.

In 1913 Britain's economic interests in China were located primarily in the Yangtse Valley including the provinces of Kiangsi, Hupeh, Anhwei and Kiangsu.

Thus Great Britain was understood to dominate the Yangtse Valley and eastern Kwangtung ... France to dominate Yunnan, Kwangsi, and western Kwangtung; Germany to dominate Shantung; Russia to dominate Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia and northern Manchuria; and Japan to dominate Fukien (opposite Formosa) and southern Manchuria.⁶⁸

However, after the second Chinese revolution in 1913, Japanese interests became increasingly active not only in Manchuria but also in the Yangtse area where their expansion brought Japan into conflict with British interests. In 1914, Admiral Yamamoto Gombei became prime minister and his cabinet included a strongly expansionist element which

67. Nish, p. 82, Lowe, p. 81-83.

68. Lowe, p. 147.

perceived the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as greatly constraining Japan's freedom of action in China.⁶⁹

While the Yamamoto cabinet was not seeking a confrontation with Britain it could not on the other hand ignore Japan's post 1905 economic development and the extent of the expansion of Japanese interests.

Japanese enterprize had been established in Shanghai for a decade and in an expansive mood. It had developed considerable interests in the Tayeh and Ping-hsiang mines and the Hanyang iron works in the Yangtse Valley and a host of ancillary industries. ... Japan was in a position to develop these interests as a complement to its own domestic industries.⁷⁰

However to develop these interests Japan needed to construct its own railway network to cover her enterprizes and hoped to do so with British co-operation. To this end Japan proposed to Britain the construction of a railroad extending from Nanking to Hsiangtan, financed jointly by Japanese and British capital. The British response was to demand equal opportunity in Manchuria if Japan was to be allowed in the Yangtse, to which the Japanese government asserted that the two positions were not analogous - that Japan's position in Manchuria arose from treaty rights.⁷¹

British resistance was labelled 'stonewalling' by the Yamamoto cabinet and "since there was little scope for doing a deal which would be truly reciprocal, Japan had

69. Nish, p. 97.

70. Ibid, p. 100.

71. Lowe, p. 161-164.

no alternative but to make a discreet encroachment on Britain's preserve."⁷² The exertion of lateral pressure in the same direction had made the alliance partners territorial and financial rivals in the Yangtse by 1914.

72. Nish, p. 99.

1914 - 1930

Because of the notion that the nation was not entirely accepted as an equal, bold action seemed needed to take advantage of the West's distress so that its post-war counter offensive would not materialize. This was the psychological background of the Twenty-One Demands, schemes to detach Manchuria and Mongolia from China, the Nishihara loans, and other policies and machinations pursued during the war. By 1918 Japan had succeeded in obtaining Chinese consent to the perpetuation of its rights in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, to the transfer of German rights in Shantung to Japan and the formation of closer military and economic ties between the two countries. In pursuing these aims, the Japanese naturally were aware of American disapproval and the image of the U.S. as a major obstacle in the way of Japanese policy in China became firmly established.⁷³

The year 1914 brought war in Europe and hence 'the time of confusion' prophized by Viscount Tani in 1887, and the opportunity for further Japanese expansion. The same year also brought the downfall of the Yamamoto administration and a new cabinet was formed in April led by Count Okuma Shigenobu, who had been prime minister in 1898. The new cabinet reflected a greater confidence and tenacity in its commitment to expansionary goals than the previous administration. In official circles and within the general public there existed great dissatisfaction with the gains made since 1900 through a co-operative stance and this feeling was recognized by the Japanese foreign office.⁷⁴ With European attention diverted by the war Japan was left with virtually

73. Iriye, p. 132.

74. Nish, p. 108 - 109.

a free hand in China. The confidence of the new administration and its perceived role for Japan is reflected in a statement by Prime Minister Okuma after assuming office which in part said:

Those who are superior will govern those who are inferior. I believe ... the world will have a few great governing countries and others will be governed by them ... We should, from now on, prepare ourselves to become a governing nation.⁷⁵

Okuma's return to active politics had been engineered primarily by the genro Marquis Inouye Kaoru who during the cabinet formation had made it clear that the new ministry should assume an active commercial role in China.⁷⁶ Such a view did not have to be forced upon Okuma nor on the new foreign minister Baron Kato Takuaki. Kato, the former ambassador to London, although friendly towards Britain and the alliance, also believed that the war provided the proper 'psychological moment' for Japan to assume her leadership role in Asia.⁷⁷ Thus Okuma and Kato, with the support of the cabinet⁷⁸ were eager to enter the war on the side of Britain as the alliance permitted. Britain too was anxious for Japanese support but the terms governing Japan's entry differed in the two countries. The British invitation read:

75. H. B. Morse, H. F. MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, p. 579.

76. Nish, p. 107.

77. Lowe, p. 170-171.

78. Nish, p. 128.

As our warships will require some time to locate and destroy the German warships in Chinese waters it is essential that the Japanese should hunt out and destroy the German armed merchant cruisers who are attacking our commerce now. If the Japanese Government would employ some of its warships in this way it would be of the greatest assistance to us.⁷⁹

The British invitation then envisaged a very limited Japanese role in the war. Kato however perceived the opportunity as one which would simultaneously advance Japanese prestige and settle all outstanding problems with China.⁸⁰

On August 7, the Japanese cabinet met to consider the British invitation. Kato proposed that Japan enter the war against Germany but that the scope of her activities not be limited. He also stressed that to enter the war would bolster Japan's role in East Asia.⁸¹ The following day the cabinet assembled again, this time in the company of the genro Yamagata, Matsukata and Oyama. At this meeting there was some debate about the consequences of a possible German victory. Moreover, the army, although favorably disposed toward the opportunity contained a strong pro-German element and was hesitant to declare war on Germany. However, Kato's arguments for enhancing Japan's prestige prevailed and the attendants approved his proposals. On August 9, Kato informed the British Foreign Office that:

79. Lowe, p. 181-182.

80. Ibid, p. 182.

81. Nish, Alliance in Decline, p. 119.

Once a belligerent Power, Japan cannot restrict her action only to destruction of hostile armed merchant cruisers, but it will become necessary for her to resort to all and every possible means for attainment of the object common to the two allied powers as far as the Chinese waters are concerned, namely the destruction of the power of Germany to inflict damage upon the interests of Japan and Great Britain in Eastern Asia.⁸²

Kato also suggested to the British Foreign Office that an attack on Tsingtao offered the best means of destroying German influence in the Far East. The reference to German possessions in Shantung prompted the British, suspicious of Japan's intentions, to reply with a note delineating the scope of Japan's activities during the war. In part the note stated that:

... the action of Japan will not extend beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China seas, or to any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the continent in Eastern Asia.⁸³

Kato regarded the substance of the note as testifying to Britain's paternal attitude toward Japan and refused to accept the limitations. Great Britain subsequently withdrew the invitation. This action, taken because of Japan's terms of entry, was received as a serious slight and was "an unprecedented blow for Japan and brought to the fore the suspicions underlying the alliance."⁸⁴ One indication that

82. Ibid, p. 120.

83. Ibid, p. 121.

84. Ibid, p. 131.

Britain's withdrawal of the invitation was considered offensive by the Japanese is found in an exchange between the Japanese ambassador in London Viscount Chinda Sutemi and British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour. Chinda stated that:

There appeared to be some apprehension lest Japan should embark on a selfish policy of aggression ... this transaction ... deeply hurt Japan's sense of honor. ⁸⁵

On August 15, Kato took his views to the cabinet and to an Imperial Conference where he received formal approval to declare war on Germany without any limitations on the scope of Japanese actions in the war, with or without British consent.

In the Japanese perception, her position in the great power system was that of an equal whose activities could not be dictated by other members of the same system. As Nish points out:

The incident highlighted the fact that Japan had already come of age, that she was no longer a power that could be brow-beaten by Great Britain. ⁸⁶

Britain finally agreed to the Japanese terms and to joint action and Kato interpreted this decision as giving Japan a free hand to act independently in China.

85. Lowe, Great Britain, p. 187.

86. Nish, Alliance in Decline, p. 131.

The significance of the events of 1914 to Japan's regional status is considerable. As Lowe points out:

... From August 1914 onwards Japan became the dominant power and Britain was clearly dependent on Japan for the defense of British interests ... The fundamental significance of the brief period from August to December 1914 was that the Far Eastern balance of power had changed overwhelmingly in Japan's favor. All the great powers were involved in the war with the exception of the United States, which was in no position to challenge Japanese dominance. Instead of the great powers treating Japan in a paternal manner and permitting her to borrow capital in London and Paris on the tacit assumption of satisfactory behavior, the positions were now reversed; ... For the Anglo-Japanese alliance the war connoted a powerful strengthening of Japan's status ... Japan could call the tune, or at least make the attempt, with no fear of effective opposition from any other power. ⁸⁷

Awareness of British and U.S. suspicions over the terms of Japan's entry into the war convinced Japanese decision-makers that Japan must use the current position to consolidate her regional status and thus present the powers with a post-war fait accompli. With this in mind, and mindful also of increased Russian activity in Outer Mongolia, Kato, in December, 1914 sent to Hioki Eki, the Japanese minister in Peking, the Twenty-One Demands, which were presented to the Chinese government in 1915. Basically the Twenty-One Demands were made up of five groups of items designed to strengthen Japan's military presence in China

87. Lowe, Great Britain, p. 215.

and to lay the framework for further political and commercial incursions there.⁸⁸ The fifth group of demands would have made China virtually a Japanese protectorate and it was this group which aroused the most ardent British and U.S. opposition.

In response to the opposition Kato presented a modified version of the demands in April, 1915 but attached a note to the British draft outlining how any further opposition would be received in Japan. In part it stated:

If ... contrary to our earnest expectation, even these new proposals fail to secure the acceptance by China the present negotiations would in fact be clearly defeated in the essential objects. Such a development would hardly be compatible with the dignity of Japan, the maintenance of which is a requisite factor in the consolidation of enduring peace in the Far East. It might even render it difficult for us to fulfill our share in the realization of the objects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.⁸⁹

The significance of the last line of the note was clear to Britain who was anxious for Japanese destroyers for use in the Pacific and the crisis was resolved in May through British pressure in China. A Sino-Japanese treaty was signed on May 25, 1915 embodying groups one through four (group five was excluded) of the demands. In part the treaty stipulated that:

88. See Appendix B for list of Demands.

89. Lowe, p. 242.

... German rights and interests in Shantung were to be completely left to the free disposal of Japan; Japanese existing privileges in South Manchuria and Liaotung were extended by 99 years and no naval installations were to be built by any foreign power in Fukien Province.⁹⁰

Through additional agreements with the governments of Britain, France, Italy and Russia, Japan was assured of support for her claims to the disposal of German rights in Shantung and possessions north of the equator, at the peace conference.

However, Japan had been able to accomplish her aims in China only in part and only in face of considerable British and American opposition. The United States had invoked the non-recognition doctrine stating that it could not -

... recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door.⁹¹

Thus another blow had been dealt to Japan's regional status, which during the war she felt was greatly enhanced, and there was little satisfaction in Japan with the overall result. The Japanese regarded Britain and the U.S. "to be hostile to Japan's China policy and as having deprived her of legitimate aims."⁹² The opposition parties in the Diet denounced

90. Fifield, p. 57.

91. Lowe, p. 251.

92. Nish, p. 156.

the Okuma government for the "humiliating reverse inflicted on Japan,"⁹³ and press reaction was particularly hostile to Great Britain.

Japanese leaders considered Japan was attempting to do no more in China than Great Britain or the United States were doing in other parts of the world. As Viscount Ishii recounts:

... Just as England solved her population problem by industrializing herself, so does Japan hope to solve her similar problem. Such was the object of the Twenty-One Demands.⁹⁴

The Japanese were hard pressed to understand why the other great powers were frustrating Japan's attempt to play a great power role in East Asia. Kennedy, for instance, cites the exasperation of the Japanese army officers over U.S. criticism of Japan's actions toward China. They could not, says Kennedy, understand why the United States should demand a higher standard of international behavior from Japan in protecting her own vital interests in the Far East than they themselves set in the Caribbean and Latin America.⁹⁵

In September, 1915 Japan was formally invited to adhere to the London Declaration - whereby she would not make a separate peace with the central powers independent of her allies. Japan's acceptance of the invitation - which pointed

93. Lowe, p. 252.

94. Ishii, p. 116.

95. Kennedy, p. 37.

to her status as a world power - guaranteed her a seat at the upcoming peace conference and "she now became a full fledged member of the wartime Entente."⁹⁶ Almost simultaneously however Japan's regional status was slighted by Britain's similar invitation to China. The invitation was later withdrawn in the face of strong opposition from Japan condemning Britain for her attempt to befriend China to the perceived detriment of Japanese aims.⁹⁷

Nevertheless, Japan's self image had changed as a result of the war and a new military class had developed adding a more explicit sense of mission than had previously existed. Japan also reaped substantial economic benefits, during the war, supplying markets formerly controlled by European nations. Allied demands for war goods had increased Japan's foreign trade by 300 per cent; the nation had a favorable balance of trade; and had become a creditor nation able to make considerable investments in China - causing great concern in American and British financial circles.

96. Nish, p. 165.

97. Ibid, p. 166.

When the Paris Peace Conference convened in 1919 Japan sought primarily three objectives: inclusion of a racial equality clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations; settlement of the question of the disposition of German islands in the north Pacific; and resolution of the Shantung question.

It was the first time that Japan had asked that the racial equality issue be considered at the international level and it was hoped that its acceptance would augment her quest for the leadership role in Asia. The principle required the unanimous consent of the conference and was thus defeated by the abstention of Britain and the United States. Japan's request for racial equality had therefore been denied by her 'equals' in the system. In Japan the response was one of harsh criticism directed at the United States and Britain by Kokusai, the leading news service, the Nippon Demo Agency and anti-American demonstrations. Viscount Ishii referred to the defeat as "another set-back for the policy which (Japan) had so long struggled." ⁹⁸

The conference also refused to grant Japan exclusive possession of the German North Pacific islands, allowing her instead custody of the islands under the provision of a League (class 'C') mandate. The United States which had led the opposition to Japan's claims also assumed

98. Ishii, Foreign Policies, p. 108.

the initiative in opposing Japan's claim to Tsinan and Shantung, refusing to recognize any agreements contained in the Twenty-One Demands at the Peace Conference. But, in the Japanese view, the nation's commanding position established in Asia during the war rested on the recognition of those agreements. The Japanese delegation justified the claims "as only just and fair in light of Japan's contributions in destroying the German bases in the Orient and safeguarding the Pacific, Indian and Mediterranean trade routes." ⁹⁹

Japan's bewilderment with U.S. opposition and treatment was reflected in a statement by delegation leader Baron Makino who told the conference that:

In Tokyo they do not seem to understand why we should be the least favored nation in our relations with Shantung simply because almost unaided we rescued the province from the German invaders. ¹⁰⁰

In the end Japan agreed to return the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao. Thus, the conference neither recognized the 1915 and 1918 treaties as Japan had demanded nor did it invalidate them as China wanted. On the other hand Japan was invited to join the League of Nations as a permanent member of the League

99. Curry, p. 263.

100. Ibid, p. 263.

Council. The invitation was considered a great honor by the Japanese. At the conference the United States and Britain had joined forces to deny Japan the full recognition of the wartime Sino-Japanese treaties which Japan had so carefully erected to assure her regional dominance in Asia.

... to many Japanese these Anglo-American efforts represented a concerted attempt to interface with affairs in their own sphere of influence. They condemned the peace settlement as the 'Pax Anglo Americana' because they felt the two powers were determined to collaborate against Japan.¹⁰¹

Japan emerged from the war as the dominant power in the Western Pacific, the greatest naval power in the Far East and the third greatest naval power in the world. Furthermore preoccupation of the other powers with Europe had allowed Japan the freedom to expand commercially and territorially. However the Hara cabinet was also cognizant of the break in Japan's prosperous wartime trade and was fearful of antagonizing the powers through a forceful expansion policy, lest Japan become isolated. While Hara favored seeking new U.S. markets, the cabinet was also under pressure from the military, nationalist societies, and financial interests anxious to consolidate and expand their wartime gains. While in the 1920s Japan's civilian leadership was

101. Nish, Alliance in Decline, p. 276.

anxious to assuage Western suspicions by their eagerness to behave like a 'civilized' member of the community of nations, opinion on 'means' was divided between the civilian leadership and the military and a substantial portion of the population.

Although the war had allowed Japan great freedom of expansion, to strengthen her bases of military power and the potential to have access to vast resources on the continent, the post-war period gave rise to a determined effort by other powers to recapture markets in China and the rest of Asia, with the United States and Britain exerting lateral pressure in this direction with renewed energy and determination. The acute commercial competition of the post-war years greatly intensified the conflict of interest between Japan on the one hand and the Western powers on the other. Despite the inauguration of a 'civilized' policy of peaceful economic expansion by the Hara cabinet, there grew among Japan's leaders a perception that Britain was joining the U.S. in an anti-Japanese policy in China.¹⁰²

In addition to the commercial competition the United States and Japan had also become naval rivals in the Pacific. The stepped-up pace of naval construction in the United States created the impression in Japan that the new

102. Ibid, p. 279.

vessels were intended for use in the Pacific and Japan responded by increasing the pace of its own naval construction, especially after the establishment of the U.S. Pacific fleet in 1919.¹⁰³ The naval race also aroused the fear in Japan that the competition might encourage a united Anglo-American front. The fear was well founded because it was time for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and in Britain opinion on the value of the alliance was divided. On the one hand there was the fear that the alliance might not be popular in the U.S.; on the other, the fear that without it Japan might seek allies elsewhere and impair British interests in Asia. Britain thus proposed to the U.S. the convening of a Pacific conference at which Pacific and Far Eastern questions would be settled and which would be attended by China and Japan. Britain hoped the Anglo-Japanese alliance could be covered by agreements resulting from the proposed conference.¹⁰⁴

In Japan, the British proposal was perceived as "paternalistic and insensitive to Japanese thinking,"¹⁰⁵ and thus reminiscent of the treatment accorded Japan in the pre-war years.¹⁰⁶ The conference had first been proposed to the United States and the Japanese felt slighted by the British and regarded the British intention as sacrificing

103. Ibid, p. 282.

104. Ibid, p. 334.

105. Ibid, p. 341.

106. Lowe, Great Britain, p. 215.

the alliance for greater Anglo-American unity.

In all this high policy, the Japanese had the feeling that they were no longer the captains of their own destiny; that their voice did not count for much over the future of the British alliance which was bound to come up at a Pacific conference.¹⁰⁷

Again, Japan's world power status was recognized by virtue of the invitation to attend the conference but her regional status was virtually ignored. Such inconsistent status treatment was causing increasing frustration in Japan and in the Hara cabinet which, while advocating peaceful expansion, was not favorably inclined towards a conference which would place the other powers on equal footing with Japan in East Asia. Great Britain and the United States had further ignored Japan by linking Pacific and Far Eastern questions to disarmament despite Japan's opposition, and Japan perceived that her position was being ignored and confronted by an Anglo-American conspiracy.¹⁰⁸

At the conference which in the end was held in Washington (1921-22) the Anglo-Japanese alliance was replaced

107. Nish, p. 341.

108. Ibid, p. 345.

by a four power treaty signed by the U.S., Britain, France and Japan. The dissolution of the alliance was perceived in Japan as "the spurning of an Asiatic power by the Western world,"¹⁰⁹ and Viscount Ishii described Britain as having "cast aside the alliance like an old pair of sandals." The Four Power Treaty in Japan was viewed as the British procurement of U.S. friendship at Japan's expense and that it -

... left Japan in the same position as the time of the Tripartite Intervention in 1895, isolated and without a firm friend to recognize her special position in the Far East.¹¹⁰

The Five Power Treaty dealing with disarmament set a capital ship ratio of five for the U.S. and Britain and three for Japan, despite Japanese opposition to the 'inferior naval position.' In Japan the leading newspapers denounced the treaty as unequal on the grounds of national security and a return to the days of the unequal treaties.¹¹¹ The treaty did however assure Japan of her regional naval predominance.

The Nine Power Treaty converted the U.S. open door policy of 1900 to a multilateral principle and Japan agreed to return Shantung to China. Thus the conference refused to recognize Japan's 'special position' in Asia and her need to expand and acquire resources and markets to

109. Kennedy, The Estrangement, p. 56.

110. Ibid, p. 53.

111. Iriye, Across the Pacific, p. 117.

maintain her great power status.

The conference was generally viewed in Japan as a conspiracy "to destroy Japan's hegemony in East Asia, including the elimination of the alliance."¹¹² The perception of inconsistent treatment along an international prestige dimension is highlighted by Kennedy who describes the Japanese feelings after the Washington conference.

The Japanese asked why they should be expected to give strict observance to the Open Door in the Far East if the door was closed to them in America. In Japanese eyes, moreover it was inconsistent with the Monroe Doctrine which in effect enabled the United States to intervene in the political affairs of the other republics of the American continent, but debarred other countries from doing so. That is, if the United States exercised a monopoly right of this kind in Central and South America why should Japan not be allowed a Monroe Doctrine in the Far East. ¹¹³

The racial issue and the question of discrimination had not abided during this period. In 1917 a law was passed in California which forbade 'aliens ineligible for citizenship' to lease agricultural land. This law, Ishii claimed, was "plainly discriminatory against the Japanese."¹¹⁴ In 1920 Japanese nationals in California were denied the privilege

112. Nish, p. 396.

113. Kennedy, p. 38.

114. Ishii, Foreign Policies, p. 106.

of leasing land of any kind and were forbidden either to act as guardians for their children or to invest in land owning companies. The constitutionality of these laws was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. But, as Ishii recounts:

... the severest cut of all was the American Immigration Act of 1924, which contained a provision excluding all Oriental immigration upon racial grounds, for the reason that Orientals were not eligible to American citizenship. Ostensibly aimed at all Asiatics, this provision was in effect ... directed against a single nation - Japan - for the reason that Chinese immigration had long been checked under the Chinese Exclusion laws ... Thus in the Immigration Act of 1924 the United States, by a one-sided act, abrogated the time-honored Gentleman's Agreement the object of which had been to forestall just this kind of statutory discrimination.¹¹⁵

Despite vigorous Japanese protests, the U.S. Congress passed the immigration bill with an impressive majority. The official reply of the Japanese government to the United States in protest of the passage of the Act is worth quoting at length to demonstrate the perception of a status slight. The memorandum in part read:

The Japanese Government are deeply concerned by the enactment in the United States of an act entitled 'Immigration Act of 1924'. While the measure was under discussion in the Congress they took the earliest opportunity to invite the attention of the American Government to a discriminatory clause ... which provides for the exclusion of aliens ineligible to

115. Ibid, p. 108.

citizenship, in contradiction to the other classes of aliens and which is manifestly intended to apply to Japanese ... the representations of the Japanese Government ... were not heeded by the Congress... The Immigration Act of 1924 considered in the light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the naturalization laws, clearly establishes the rule that the admissibility of aliens to the United States rests not upon the individual merits or qualifications, but upon the division of race to which applicants belong. In particular, it appears that such racial discrimination in the Act is directed essentially against Japanese, since persons of other Asiatic races are excluded under separate enactments of prior dates ... It is not denied that fundamentally speaking, it lies within the inherent sovereign power of each state to limit and control immigration to its own domains, but when, in the exercise of such right, an evident injustice is done to a foreign nation in disregard of its proper self-respect ... the question necessarily assumes an aspect which justifies diplomatic discussion and adjustments.¹¹⁶

In a separate note to U.S. Secretary Hughes, before the bill was passed, the Japanese ambassador had also written that:

... It is difficult to believe that it can be the intention of the people of your great country ... to resort ... to a measure which would not only seriously offend the pride of a friendly nation ... but would also seem to involve the question of good faith and therefore the honor of their Government.¹¹⁷

116. Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 2, p. 398-401.

117. Young Hum Kim, East Asia's Turbulent Century, p. 77.

Viscount Ishii explained the Japanese reaction stating that:

To us it is a matter of ideals rather than a question of material interest. Ever since we entered into the family of nations ... we have spared no efforts toward internal readjustment and reform, so that the civilized Powers may admit us into their circle upon an equal footing. By 1900 they had signified their appreciation of our achievements by restoring judicial autonomy to us and in 1911, they restored to us tariff autonomy. Only the statutory exclusion of our emigrants by the American Congress stand in the way of our coveted goal of equality ... Full appreciation of our disappointment at the exclusion clause ... is possible only when it is projected against the background of seventy years for the realization of our aspiration for equality.¹¹⁸

Public reaction in Japan was one of shock and embitterment manifested in a wave of bitter anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the country.¹¹⁹ It was not the substance of the act which caused such intense reactions but rather its psychological effects on the Japanese people. As Kennedy explains:

Following as it did the rejection of her demand for racial equality at the Versailles Conference in 1919 the ... legislation was a further blow to Japanese pride. Already smarting under the implications of racial inferiority reflected in such terms as 'the White Australian policy' and the 'Yellow Peril' this latest insult served to stir up some of the old feelings of bitterness and resentment and the explicit espousal of the Pan-Asiatic movement.¹²⁰

118. Ishii, Foreign Policies, p. 109.

119. Royama, p. 36.

120. Kennedy, p. 74.

The effects of the Act, in addition to the previous inconsistent status treatment caused a sharp change in the 'mood' of Japan. The Shidehara policy of the 1920s had tried to display Japan's 'civility' through a policy of peaceful, co-operative economic expansion but the treatment accorded Japan had seriously undermined this policy. Japan had sought to gain Western recognition of her dominant regional position and her right to assume a role in East Asia similar to that of Britain and the U.S. elsewhere, but such recognition, which would legitimize Japan's leadership of East Asia, had not been forthcoming. The failure of peaceful, co-operative 'means' to this end had created a frustrating situation and there grew a feeling that with or without such recognition the role would be assumed through more forceful 'means' if necessary. As Royama points out:

Thereafter (1924 Act) ... Japan turned her back on the collective system of diplomacy, and ... the campaigns of 'Asia for the Asiatics' was vigorously revived among the ... continentalists in Japan. 121

In 1927 the new premier Baron Tanaka presided over the Eastern Conference which reviewed Japan's China policy and which provides some indication of Japan's determination

121. Royama, p. 36-37.

to protect her interests. Based on off-the-record conversations with conference participants, Kennedy, then a Reuters correspondent, concludes that the conference made it clear that Japan would never hesitate to take whatever action she considered necessary to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.¹²² "It seemed obvious that (the conference) wanted it to be made known abroad that Japan was contemplating some definite action in the near future in accordance with these guiding principles."¹²³ In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek's armies had begun the northward march from Canton to Shanghai to deal with northern warlords. The suspicion in Japan was that Chiang was receiving Western assistance for his endeavor, and Tanaka, while favoring co-operation with the West, made it clear that Japan possessed special rights in China and was rightfully entitled to protect and further those rights.

The perception of Western assistance to China as intentional and harmful interference with legitimate Japanese aims continued throughout Japan's expansionary period until the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. For example, at the 38th Liaison Conference on July 10, 1941 then foreign minister Matsuoka argued that Western assistance to China:

122. Kennedy, p. 83.

123. Ibid, p. 84.

... makes it impossible to establish a new order in East Asia. Britain and the United States *have continued to aid Chiang until the present time*; and they are planning to obtain an advantageous position in China in the future ... In short the United States is trying to destroy Japanese leadership in East Asia.¹²⁴

In 1927 Tanaka took the opportunity provided by the Eastern Conference to make Japan's intentions explicit stating that:

if disturbances should spread to Manchuria and Mongolia and menace Japan's special position and interests in these regions, the Imperial Government must be prepared to combat this menace, regardless of where the danger may originate.¹²⁵

In the summer of 1928 Peking fell to the Nationalists and the following year the Nationalists notified Japan of the expiration of the 1896 treaty governing the treatment of Japanese nationalists. Japan responded with a denial of the expiration and negotiations ceased to make any substantial progress. Within a few days the U.S. and China signed a new tariff agreement which was perceived in Japan as a further interference with Japan's aims in China.

124. Nobutaka Ike, Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences, p. 95.

125. Policy decision cited in part in Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy ... p. 32.

The signing on July 25, 1928 of the Sino-Japanese tariff treaty, at a time when Japan and China had reached an impasse, strengthened China's position. Europe followed the lead of the U.S. and the Japanese were angered.¹²⁶

The U.S. action implied de facto recognition of the new regime in China and was regarded in Japan as an obvious interference. In the Japanese view, after all, China was Japan's concern and the Japanese certainly were not inclined to see the creation of a united China with Western assistance thus clearly obviating Japan's perceived role. The Japanese press was highly critical "of what they construed as an attempt on the part of Washington to secure the leadership of the foreign powers in China by showing uncritical and unconditional sympathy towards the Chinese."¹²⁷

It is informative to note the continuity of the Japanese perception of Western assistance to China as constituting an unjust interference with Japanese policy by comparing this reaction to the reaction some thirteen years later. The Japanese government memorandum presented to the United States on December 7, 1941 read in part:

... both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist (the Chinese Nationalists) so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavors towards the stability of East Asia... Obviously it is the intention

126. Kennedy, p. 124.

127. Ibid, p. 125.

of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts ... 128

Another instance of perceived interference by the West, specifically the United States, is found during the 1929 Sino-Soviet dispute when U.S. Secretary H. L. Stimson invoked the Kellogg pact as the means to resolve the conflict.

The initial reaction of the Japanese press was one of mild reproof to the U.S. for interfering in a dispute concerning Manchuria, the special preserve of Japan, China and Russia. It was up to Japan rather than anyone else, the papers contended to make the first move, if any move was required. 129

While reaction may have been subdued it nevertheless served "to underline the touchiness of Japan on any sign of outside interference, especially U.S. interference in matters concerning Manchuria." 130

Failure to achieve a 10:7 naval ratio in capital ships with the U.S. and Britain the following year at the London Naval Conference again called Japan's regional status into question. Japan's naval policy at the conference, as it had been in 1922, was aimed at gaining naval supremacy over the U.S. in her home waters.¹³¹ The Japanese delegation failed to achieve the desired 10:7 ratio, despite its openly expressed dissatisfaction with the naval status accorded Japan at the Washington Conference.

128. Cited in Quigley, p. 324.

129. Kennedy, p. 139.

130. Ibid, p. 139.

131. Crowley, p. 41.

Japan ratified the London Naval Treaty but not before opposition to the terms of the treaty precipitated a near constitutional crisis in Japan and highlighted the split in the country's ruling circles. Naval opposition was led by Admiral Kato, Chief of the Naval General Staff and his staff assistant Vice Admiral Suetsugu, whose following included young naval officers, the military, especially the officers of the Kwantung Army* and a large civilian element, all of whom claimed the treaty served to perpetuate Japan's world naval inferiority and to seriously compromise her regional naval superiority.¹³² Admiral Kato resigned in protest against the ratification stating that he "had no confidence that an adequate defense plan could be worked out on the basis of the London Naval Treaty."¹³³ The Japanese military and opposition parties in the Diet denounced the Minseito government and particularly foreign minister Shidehara for what they called his 'weak-kneed' diplomacy. Most significantly the treaty accentuated the growing split in the nation's ruling circles¹³⁴ by enhancing the position of some of the military and the continental expansionists.

* The Kwantung Army was stationed in Manchuria.

132. Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military, p. 65.

133. Ibid, p. 67.

134. For analyses of the triangular relationship between the Kwantung Field Army and the central military and civilian leadership see Yoshihashi, *ibid*, and Sadako Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932.

While the London Treaty perpetuated Japan's inferior world status, statistically her superior regional position appears to have remained intact (cf appendix C). Whether or not the opposition were guilty of trying to deceive others and/or of self-deception as well is a moot point. It is however important to note that prior to the conference Prime Minister Hamaguchi told his cabinet, leaders of the opposition and Privy Council leaders that the Japanese delegation would demand a 10:7 ratio. This ratio, he said, was "indispensable to the security of the empire."¹³⁵ The negative reaction in Japan to the London Treaty may be more understandable in light of such official pre-conference statements. Nevertheless, several other factors may be drawn from this period as contributing to the Manchurian incident the following year.

The civilian leadership, particularly Shidehara, had sought to promote Japanese aims in Asia through a co-operative stance with the West but Japan's regional status had not been acknowledged by the other Powers. Members of the Kwantung Army in particular were frustrated by Western refusal to recognize Japan's dominant regional position and other means were now considered. In addition, the general populace was in a responsive mood for any kind of

135. Crowley, Quest, p. 43.

expansionary activities that held the promise of relief from the general dissatisfaction with financial and economic problems. The post war (i.e., post 1918) economic slump in Japan hampered the government's response to the new demand structure created by the economic growth stimulated in 1905 and which slumped in the post-war period.

In the post-war period Japan faced renewed competition from the powers in China and encountered further frustrations in her world trade, e.g., tariff barriers, which greatly restricted her range of potential markets and resources.

... the area of her expansion has already been pre-empted. All the areas are under the political control of Western nations which adopt closed door policies not only toward her emigration but to vicarious emigration in the shape of industrial goods, the export of which is necessary for the obtaining of raw materials and machinery for her industries as well for purchasing other amenities of life.¹³⁶

Japanese merchants in 1928 had attempted to improve Japan's trading position by protesting to the U.S. Congress over the artificial non-competitive position of many Japanese exports in the U.S. Despite the appeals by Japanese business interests Congress approved the raising of tariffs on several Japanese imports. Development of her exports and manufactured goods, especially in the U.S. had been considered

136. Kenzo Takayanagi, "A Japanese View of the Struggle in the Far East," in International Affairs, No. 1 Vol. xviii (Jan, 1939).

essential in Japan (Shidehara for instance placed great hope in the U.S. Market) and such incidents cast further doubt on Shidehara's co-operative policy. Moreover the effects of the world depression were acutely felt in Japan. It brought about a steep decline both in the purchasing power of the U.S. and in commodity prices with the result that the U.S. market for Japanese goods severely contracted. Japanese farmers and businessmen suffered from the collapse of the rice market and the disastrous drop in the price of raw silk when the U.S. demand dropped.¹³⁷ In 1930 the United States dealt a further blow to the Japanese economy by raising the import duties on Japanese goods by an average of 23 per cent through the introduction of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. All of these factors contributed a sense of urgency to the settlement of the Manchurian question.

... The fantastic overcrowding of Japan's main islands, poor in natural resources, yet forced to absorb an annual population increase of a million ... contributed to it a sense of self-righteousness or manifest destiny. Japan was convinced that her solution depended upon free access to the raw materials and markets of China, not as a population outlet but as a means of industrializing her teeming millions at home.¹³⁸

Dissatisfaction with the financial policies of the government and the hardship caused by the trade depression

137. Yoshihashi, p. 109.

138. A. W. Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, p. 401.

prompted the belief among farmers, the industrial and commercial communities, the military and some members of the civilian leadership that a more vigorous foreign policy would help alleviate Japan's economic situation. Even within the foreign ministry where Shidehara usually drew support there was a concensus that the future of Japan lay in the "political leadership of an East Asian power bloc ... and by 1931 Foreign Minister Shidehara lacked firm support for his foreign policy within his own ministry."¹³⁹

Leaders of the Kwantung Army had come to view Manchuria as a supply source for future expansion and as a means of alleviating Japan's economic situation.¹⁴⁰

... Though conceding that the depression in Japan was part of a world-wide phenomenon (they) emphasized that the weakness of Japan's industrial foundation would not allow her to survive the pinch through internal measures alone. Not only could Japan not develop as an industrial state without controlling raw material sources and a market for finished goods; she could not even maintain her relatively retarded economic position because a rapidly growing population pressed upon her limited land and resources. The possession of Manchuria was presented as the first step in breaking the deadlock. ... In the minds of the Kwantung Army leadership there was a definite connection between the welfare of the Japanese people and the need for foreign expansion.¹⁴¹

Furthermore, within the Japanese General Staff, as well as within the Kwantung Army, there was a growing concern

139. Crowley, p. 110.

140. Ogata, p. 44.

141. Ibid, p. 44.

with the increased strength of the Soviet Red Army in the maritime provinces and the perception of the need to secure a strategic advantage through military action in Manchuria to confront the Red Army on the borders of Manchuria.¹⁴²

Japan's mood was changed considerably in 1930 * from what it had been after the First World War. Japan had been frustrated in her attempt to assume the leadership of East Asia and by the beginning of the decade of the thirties there were clear signs of a shift of power and control over both domestic and foreign policy in Japan. The attempt at peaceful expansion in the 1920s had not been fruitful in achieving Japanese aims and the result was the enhancement of the position of the military, the nationalists and intellectuals.¹⁴³ By 1930 "it was felt that the expulsion of Japan from the economic development of China would mean the gradual decline of Japan as a great power."¹⁴⁴ Thus force now was viewed by the military as an alternative means to achieve the ends pursued by diplomatic means throughout the decade.

By the early 1930s there was almost universal consensus that the peaceful economic diplomacy of the 1920s had brought no benefits to Japan and that in fact it had been powerless even to safeguard the nation's existing rights and interests.¹⁴⁵

142. Ibid, p. 41-45; also Crowley, p. 108-112; Yoshihashi, p. 119-151.

143. Iriye, in "The Failure of Military Expansion," in James Morley (ed) Dilemmas of Growth in Pre-War Japan, p. 109.

144. Iriye, Across, p. 125.

145. Iriye in Morley, p. 107.

1931 - 1938

On the night of September 18, 1931 the Japanese Kwantung Army, citing an alleged plot to destroy part of the South Manchurian Railway, attacked Chinese troops and within five months drove out all Chinese garrisons, seized all strategic points in Manchuria, occupied Mukden, Changchun, Chinchow, Harbin, and other cities and established the state of Manchukuo. 146

REACTION AT HOME AND ABROAD

Despite disagreement between the Kwantung field army, the Central Command and the civilian leadership over the Manchurian operation, the general public and the press stood firmly behind the Kwantung Army.

The populace rejoiced over the military achievements. Moreover, since the whole issue of the protection of Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria was closely related to the feeling of unrest and uncertainty at home, Japanese control over Manchuria was taken as a sign for a more prosperous future. The actual war boom seemed to confirm that great benefits were expected of Manchuria. In fact, the leading dailies fully endorsed the military action in Manchuria as a righteous act of self-defense. Even the Asahi, which was forthright in criticizing the arrogance of the military supported the Manchurian Affair on the basis that Japan ... had acted in defense of important rights and interests which were being violated.¹⁴⁷

146. The decision-making process with regard to the invasion of Manchuria and the relationship between the Field Army, the Central Command and the Civilian leadership is analyzed in detail in Ogata, Yoshihashi, and Crowley. Here I am more concerned with facilitating factors and the resultant effects on Japanese foreign policy.

147. Ogata, p. 146.

In keeping with established policy Japan requested that the Manchurian incident be settled through joint Sino-Japanese negotiations without outside interference. Nevertheless, China, on September 19 appealed to both the League and the United States for assistance. The League responded on September 22 by urging China and Japan to cease further hostilities and to withdraw troops until a settlement could be negotiated. U.S. Secretary of State H.L. Stimson further informed the Japanese government, through its ambassador in Washington, that the situation was not, as Japan contended, the exclusive concern of the two parties directly involved. Rather Stimson claimed the Japanese action was in violation of the Nine Power Treaty and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact.

Such opposition by the Powers to Japan's territorial expansion constituted a status slight. Japanese leaders considered they were doing no more than the other powers had or were doing in other parts of the world. This view is expressed by Ishii who explained that:

Japan is an island nation. But her distance from the continent of Asia is so small that she cannot be indifferent to what happens in Korea, Manchuria, China ... any more than England can keep aloof from developments in the Low Countries across the channel and along the North Sea. Particularly in Korea and Manchuria, we have consistently followed a policy dictated by the sole motive of establishing our own security. We have looked upon their frontiers as our frontiers, even as England looks upon the frontiers of the Low Countries as her own. 148

148. Ishii, p. 110.

On October 8, 1931 Japanese bombed the provisional capital Chinchow. After this incident Japan rejected an Anglo-American resolution for referred negotiations, standing fast against outside interference in East Asia. The U.S. and the League then jointly invoked the Kellogg Pact and ordered Japan to withdraw all its troops by November 16. In Japan, War Minister Minami had suggested that Japan withdraw from the League if it insisted on immediate troop withdrawals and now:

... the newspapers editorially criticized the 'illusion of the Council' and branded the Council resolution as an 'attempt to deprive ... Japan of her natural rights'.

The invocation of the Kellogg Pact provides another solid example of inconsistent status treatment and was perceived as such in Japan. The Pact included an 'escape' clause, inserted at the insistence of Britain, which assured the signatories that the pact would in no way impair the right of a nation to self-defense - and this was precisely Japan's justification.

Less than a year after the signing of the pact Foreign Minister Tanaka, in a speech to the Japanese Diet, had clearly stated for future reference the relationship between the pact and Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. He cited the two areas as "within the

sphere where our right of self-defense can be exercised", and thus Japan in these instances could not be bound by the pact.¹⁴⁹

Japan was doing no more than invoking the self-defense doctrine to justify the use of force in Manchuria in the same way that Great Britain justified the use of force in "certain undefined areas lying outside the British Empire; by the United States in Latin America and elsewhere."¹⁵⁰

Normally the question of self-defense was subject to the interpretation of international law but in the case of the Kellogg Pact the U.S. had stressed that it was a matter to be decided by each state alone. When Japan reminded the powers of this clause the U.S. refused to recognize the limitations of the pact in this regard.

Japan had justified its action in Manchuria on the grounds that such action was necessary for the protection of Japanese lives and property and stated that Japan alone was the sole judge of its purpose in Manchuria. The powers and especially the U.S. had vigorously protested Japanese action as a breach of treaties. However, in the Japanese view the United States, on the other hand had cited identical reasons to justify its intervention in the Caribbean and steadfastly refused to arbitrate any question arising in this area.

149. Foreign Policy Reports, "American Policy Towards the Sino-Japanese Dispute, p. 282 (Feb. 1, 1933) Vol. viii, No. 24.

150. Ibid, p. 287

Furthermore:

... by establishing a military operation in Haiti and Santo Domingo during World War I and intervening in Nicaragua in 1926-27 the United States has admittedly went beyond what was necessary to protect lives and property. Owing to the extent of Chinese resistance, the Japanese activities in Manchuria may have been conducted on a larger scale ... but it is difficult to see how this circumstance in itself alters the legal nature of Japan's acts.¹⁵¹

In effect the United States, and the other protesting powers were attempting to forbid Japan to pursue the very same kind of objectives that they themselves pursued and were actively pursuing. For instance, less than six months after the signing of the Kellogg Pact the United States had justified its Caribbean policy as the expansion of national policy in the realm of self-preservation and the necessities of security.¹⁵² Japan then wondered that:

... If the U.S. is justified in controlling Cuba, Haiti and Nicaragua on the ground of self-preservation, is not Japan similarly justified in maintaining control over Manchuria. To the Japanese Manchuria is as vital as Panama to the U.S. In the Japanese opinion the United States has attempted to induce Japan to internationalize its Manchurian policy while consistently refusing to internationalize its own policy in the Caribbean ... the Japanese believed that the policy of the U.S. was motivated less by a disinterested desire to uphold the Anti-War Pact than by the desire to score another nationalist victory over Japan.¹⁵³

151. Ibid, p. 287.

152. Ibid, p. 288.

153. Ibid, p. 288.

In January, 1932 Sino-Japanese hostilities extended to Shanghai, the International Settlement, and the attitude of the powers toward Japan stiffened. Shortly after the outbreak of the hostilities Britain responded to a U.S. request for joint action by dispatching two cruisers and reinforcements of marines to Shanghai. The United States sent its entire Asiatic squadron from Manila. Because of the sensitivity of the powers to hostilities at or near the International Settlement and anxious to avoid any setbacks in the settlement of the Manchurian affair Japan invited international mediation. However, among the terms insisted upon by the U.S. and the League were a demand for the creation of a neutral zone policed by neutrals and that neutrals supervise the peace talks. Such demands were perceived as a further slight to Japan's regional position and hence she rejected the terms.¹⁵⁴ The rejection conveyed the message that Japan would not submit to outside interference in matters affecting Sino-Japanese relations whether in Manchuria or Shanghai.

It is of paramount importance to realize that Japan regarded East Asia as the region where she was the dominant power in the same way as the U.S. exercised dominant influence in Latin America and Britain in India and parts of Africa. Through foreign interference Japan was made aware of status slights. That is, the denial to Japan of the same rights and privileges in East Asia as the powers

154. In May, 1932 Japanese defeated Chinese resistance and an armistice was signed.

enjoyed elsewhere, indicated that in this regard she was not being treated as an equal. Japanese leaders were very much aware of their nation's great power status and the respect they felt due to the nation. For example, at an Imperial Conference on September 19, 1940 then Foreign Minister Matsuoka was asked if the powers would not react to Japan's expansion into Southeast Asia. "Japan is not Spain," Matsuoka snapped in reply, "We are a great power with a strong navy in Far Eastern Waters."¹⁵⁵ As earlier indicated continued Western interference came to be regarded as a conspiracy to seize the leadership of East Asia from Japan and deprive her of the resources needed to maintain her great power status. That this was the Japanese perception is evidenced by a statement made in 1941 by then Premier Konoye to an Imperial Conference.

... the United States, Great Britain ...
oppose our Empire with all available means.
... If we allow this situation to continue, it
is inevitable that our Empire will gradually
lose the ability to maintain its national
power, and that our national power will
lag behind that of the United States, Great
Britain and others.¹⁵⁶

On February 18, 1932 the Kwantung Army formally proclaimed the sovereign state of Manchuria and the League joined the U.S. in applying the non-recognition doctrine "to any situation, treaty or agreement entered into by Japan

155. Ike, *Japan's Decision*, p. 12.

156. *Ibid*, p. 138.

and China in violation of the covenants of these treaties, which affect the rights of our governments or citizens in China." The reactions of the powers to Japan's activities during and after Manchuria "created the impression in Japan that the Western nations, as well as China, were restricting Japan's 'righteous mission' on the continent of Asia." ¹⁵⁷

As earlier mentioned, Japan's membership in the League Council on a permanent basis had testified to her status. Now, however, the League was attempting to discipline Japan in a way it never before had with regard to a great power, thus clearly subjecting Japan to differential status treatment.

Between the invasion of Manchuria and governmental recognition of Manchukuo on September 15, 1932 Japan had three cabinet changes. The Wakatsuki cabinet resigned on December 11, 1931, a month after the prime minister had been attacked by an assassin. The Inukai cabinet was formed on December 13 and five months later Prime Minister Inukai was assassinated and the Saito cabinet was formed on May 26, 1932. But unlike the others it was not led by a party leader. The full political weight of the army now was felt in Japanese politics and after the Inukai assassination the army, by threatening to reject by veto any party government, made that weight known to the cabinet makers.¹⁵⁸ Instead, Saito Makoto, a former governor of Korea, formed a coalition cabinet which included members from both the Seiyukai and Minseito political

157. Brown, p. 138.

158. Ogata, p. 154-55.

parties.

The passing of the Inukai Cabinet is generally considered to have marked the end of party government in pre World War II Japan, in the sense that no political party leader was to head the government for more than a decade thereafter. The main feature of the Inukai Cabinet does not lie in its party foundation, however, but in the shift of political power in favor of the military that took place during its six months in office, and decisively after May 15 ... Thus the government became increasingly sensitive to military demands ... The decisive increase in the political power of the military could not but exert itself in the realm of policy formulation. The Saito Cabinet ... was designed to be accommodating to the military, especially with regard to Manchuria.¹⁵⁹

On September 15, 1932 the new Japanese government formally recognized the new state of Manchukuo, about the same time as a League commission under the directorship of Lord Lytton of Britain was preparing its assessment of the situation. The League and the United States were committed to abide by the findings of the Lytton Commission, and its findings published in October were sharply opposed to Japanese policy. The Commission in part denied that Japan had acted in self-defense; called for the withdrawal of all armed forces; and "Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria were to be assured by a Sino-Japanese treaty providing 'free participation of Japan in the economic development of Manchuria but not the right to politically or economically control the country'".¹⁶⁰ As Ogata points out:

What Japan had meanwhile adopted as national

159. Ibid, p. 156-158

160. Ibid, p. 172.

policy with regard to Manchuria was directly opposed to the settlement outlined by the Lytton Commission ... The objectives of Japanese policy toward Manchuria had gone far beyond the 'free participation of Japan in the economic development of Manchuria' approved by the Lytton Commission, and aimed at the complete control of the country, militarily, economically and politically. ¹⁶¹

In Japan, after the publication of the Lytton report:

... public sentiment has stirred to a higher pitch of resentment against the unreasonableness and injustice of Western powers ... (and) fears were aroused that the Western powers might join forces against Japan ... It was at this time ... that Japanese businessmen became excited about the tariff barriers that were being thrown up against Japanese goods. These moves were considered to be nearsighted and to be convincing evidence that the Western nations were bent on preventing Japan from obtaining her just due, in trade as well as in land and resources. ¹⁶²

In February, 1933 the League adopted the Lytton Commission report and the following month Japan announced her withdrawal from the League in protest. At home, Matsuoka Yosuke, the Japanese delegate at the League "was hailed as a national hero because of his courageous stand against the selfish Western powers." ¹⁶³ Summing up the significance of

161. Ibid, p. 172

162. Brown, p. 193.

163. Ibid, p. 194

the period, Ogata states that:

The change in Japanese foreign policy that took place in the 1931-1932 period was drastic. It signalled the breakdown of a balance between the two major objectives of continental expansion and international cooperation... The Japanese decision to withdraw (from the League) signified a final victory of the policy of placing priority on Manchuria operations at the expense of international cooperation.¹⁶⁴

In effect, implementation of her perceived regional role now took priority over waiting for Western recognition of Japan's regional hegemony and in response to the frustrating situation created by the inconsistent status treatment accorded Japan.

In 1931, faced with the deteriorating global economic situation, Japan devaluated the Yen and this was accompanied by a continuing decline in its exchange value greatly benefiting her export trade. The result was an increase in the level of Japan's trade while world trade was contracting, and Britain and the United States in particular complained bitterly about unfair competition. In response these countries began raising tariffs on Japanese goods increasingly closing Japan out of the world market thus greatly increasing the importance of China to Japan's economic well being. The United States, especially between

164. Ogata, p. 196

1934 and 1937 adopted stern economic counter measures in response to protests from American businessmen over Japan's penetration of the markets of the Philippines and South America. The U.S. government refused to include Japan among the nations accorded reciprocal trade agreements and in 1936 raised the tariff on cotton textiles by an average of 42 per cent, "thus seriously affecting about three-fifths of Japanese cotton goods sold in the United States."¹⁶⁵ That the United States and other countries were "raising import barriers, making them higher, more rigid and more pointed against Japanese goods," created the impression in Japan that without free access to markets she "would have to drop back to a poorer standard of living, and a lesser rating among the powers."¹⁶⁶

British economic activities were perceived in Japan as a plot against that country as Ann Trotter points out:

Britain's departure from the gold standard in 1931 had been followed by a ten per cent tariff on all imports and in November, 1932 after the imperial economic conference in Ottawa, by a system of imperial preferences. The Japanese interpreted these tariff barriers as hostile and directed against them. The

165. H. F. MacNair, D. F. Lach, Modern Far Eastern International Relations, p. 217.

166. H. Feis, The Road To Pearl Harbor, p. 3.

arms embargo instituted by Britain in February 1933 against Japan and China was seen in Japan as a further step in this British plot to organize an economic blockage against them. 167

Moreover, the British Foreign Office, under pressure from the Board of Trade and the India Office, agreed to abrogate the 1911 Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty to protect British markets in India and West Africa. In Japan this action was perceived as though Britain -

... had seized a moment when the Japanese were out of favor with the rest of the world to deal her a staggering blow. Some Japanese cabinet ministers and the military party including young officers were reported to be interpreting the abrogation as the beginning of an economic boycott inspired by League of Nations policy. 168

Establishment of Japan's dominant position in East Asia and free access to China's markets and resources thus assumed overwhelming importance to Japan, and the more determined style of Japanese diplomacy was exemplified by foreign minister Hirota who insisted on Western recognition of Japan's control over Manchuria and North China. Japan's twin demands for security and equality and the means to attain these goals were clearly presented in the U.S. in 1933 by Viscount Ishii. In a speech to the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, Ishii explained that:

To realize these national aspirations
... would require a complete restructuring

167. Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933-37 (Cambridge University Press, 1975) p. 28-29.

168. Ibid, p. 30.

of the diplomacy of Asia including a recognition that peace and stability would prevail in the Far East only if the Occidental nations gradually abrogated their treaty rights on the mainland. 169

Great Britain and the United States on the other hand felt that their interests would be best safeguarded and enhanced by a China that was, strong, unified and modernized, and this was to be accomplished through the supply of Western loans, technical and military advisors, and armaments to aid the Nationalist government. Japan's Asiatic Monroe Doctrine and the presence of Western powers in China on these terms were considered wholly incompatible by the Japanese. Western assistance to China¹⁷⁰ was perceived in Japan as interference with Japanese objectives. Foreign Minister Hirota declared Western assistance to China as interfering with Japan's 'mission' in East Asia and that if Japan was to achieve its objectives in that region it "should be prepared to destroy other country's programs of military, political and economic assistance to China."¹⁷¹ Japan felt the other powers were subsidizing China and thus trying to build a 'retaining wall' against Japan's expansion to deprive her of the role she sought in East Asia, and to which she felt entitled.

In April, 1934 a statement by Amai Eiji, a spokesman for the Japanese foreign office made clear Japan's view of her position and role in East Asia. The three-fold declaration stated that: (1) Japan is solely responsible for

169. Crowley, p. 187

170. For a discussion of Western assistance to China see, for example, Trotter, P. 61-87; Royama, p. 124-142; C.A. Buss, The Far East, p. 330-340.

171. Crowley, p. 173

the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia, and Japan has the mission, and determination, to assume this responsibility; (2) China must ultimately depend upon her own re-awakening and efforts for her territorial and administrative integrity and the restoration of her internal order, and if China should attempt to play one foreign power against the other in order to attain these objectives, Japan cannot help taking necessary measures to counteract this attempt; (3) Any joint actions undertaken by foreign Powers, even in the name of financial or technical assistance, at this particular junction after the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents, would necessarily acquire political significance and lead either to the creation of 'spheres of interest' in China or to an international control, or even partition of that country; and consequently, Japan cannot but strongly object to any such actions.¹⁷²

The 'Amau Principles' made clear Japan's feelings about outside interference in Sino-Japanese relations. Japan would still rely on diplomacy in its international relations - but a different kind of diplomacy than in the past. Japan now felt she was setting the ground rules for the international relations of the Far East.¹⁷³

172. Royama, p. 134.

173. It is significant to point out, as Royama does that the substance of the Amau statement was "practically the same as that of the instructions given by Foreign Minister Hirota to Japan's diplomatic missions to Foreign countries."

The Amai statement coincided with negotiations in London, Washington and Nanking on the subject of additional loans to China. The Western powers responded by continuing to lend money and to send military advisors to China.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, the following year the Chinese nationalist government began to nationalize silver and stabilize the country's currency with British assistance. In Japan this action was interpreted as though:

England was moving toward a policy of supporting China in order to check Japanese expansion. The reaction in Japan, official and private, was extremely hostile and bitter. The Chinese were accused of selling their country to foreigners, and the British were denounced for their imperialistic policies. Fears of combined opposition from Western powers mounted ... 175

The question of naval limitations was to be renewed in 1935 at a second London Naval Conference and the Japanese were anxious to secure recognition of their dominant regional position at this meeting. The Japanese delegation began pre-conference talks with Great Britain in October of 1934 stressing that the conference set a common upper limit of naval tonnage. This upper limit was to be determined "by the requirements of the power which had need of the largest

174. For a discussion of Western response to the Japanese challenge, see for example, Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1964) p. 46-100, also Trotter, *ibid*, p. 61-87.

175. Brown, p. 201.

navy," and "within this limit each country would have the right to build in the manner it deemed fit." ¹⁷⁶ To this proposal the British strongly objected on the grounds that it would be to the detriment of the country with world-wide commitments while benefiting countries with only regional concerns. The Japanese proposal meant also that existing ratios, established in 1922 and 1930 would be abolished. Japan thus "attached the utmost importance" to the proposal "as a matter of national prestige" and the Japanese government notified Britain that it could not accept any solution "which did not meet the desire of the Japanese to have actual liberty." ¹⁷⁷ In similar pre-conference discussions with the United States Japan's proposal for the establishment of a common upper limit was also rejected as was Japan's proposal for dual control of the Pacific. The proposal was for Japanese superiority in the Western Pacific with the U.S. assuming a similar role in the Eastern Pacific.

In their refusals the Western powers had again slighted Japan's regional status and on December 29, 1934 the Japanese government formally abrogated the Washington and London Naval Treaties. Neither side had altered its position when the conference opened in December 1935 and, deprived of the equality she sought, Japan withdrew from the talks.

176. Trotter, p. 110

177. Ibid, p. 111.

Russo-Japanese relations had also become strained since 1931 with the number of troop clashes along the Soviet-Manchukuo border increasing sharply after 1934. Thus in 1936 Japan reassessed its foreign policy with a view toward restraining the Russians and settling the China problem. The 'Fundamental Principles of National Policy' was approved by the Hirota cabinet in August 1936. The policy -

... was designed to enable Japan to reorganize the east Asian sphere in a spirit of co-prosperity and co-existence based on the Imperial way.¹⁷⁸

The 'Principles' included the acquisition of naval power sufficient to secure the command of the Western Pacific - which would require access to the resources of the South Seas. However, while the cabinet approved the general principles of the new policy outline, specific means to achieve the stated objectives were not set down.

So in the absence of a reasonable precise cabinet policy (or means) each ministry interpreted the Fundamental Principles ... in light of its own paramount concerns and interests.¹⁷⁹

The navy began building up its forces for future incursions into the South Seas, the Army doubled the size of the Kwantung Army and set about creating a political system in Manchuria more responsive to its needs; and the foreign

178. Trotter, p. 190.

179. Crowley, p. 296.

ministry concentrated on the need to create a pro-Japanese zone in North China and to build the foundation for the New Order with the Japan-China-Manchuria bloc as its core.¹⁸⁰

By the summer of 1937 it was becoming clear to the Japanese that Manchuria alone was incapable of providing the resources needed to support the industrial power required for Japan to maintain a dominant position in East Asia.

Hence the extensive and largely underdeveloped resources of China ... came to be regarded as indispensable to the achievement of Japan's greater economic aims.¹⁸¹

Moreover, Japan perceived her mission as 'saving' China from the Western powers, creating a new solidarity of the Asiatic races and a distinct cultural region under Japanese leadership. To achieve this mission Japan sought the co-operation of China and resolved to eliminate any interference with her mission. In 1935 foreign minister Hirota, in a speech to the Japanese Diet, called on China to "awaken to the realization of the whole situation of East Asia and undertake to meet the genuine aspiration of Japan ... it is our policy to try to assist China in the attainment of this goal."¹⁸² Western assistance to and investment in China

180. Ibid, p. 298; Trotter, p. 190-191.

181. Battistini, p. 143.

182. Seiji Hishida, Japan Among The Great Powers: A Survey of Her International Relations, (Longmans, Green & Co. 1940) p. 354.

was perceived as preventing the 'awakening' of China to which Hirota referred and thus an interference with the Japanese mission. It was felt that foreign investment would create an 'imperia in imperio' which would lead to the break-up of China. Viscount Ishii maintains that by the time Japan was ready to assume her rightful role in East Asia China -

had already become so helpless in the face of foreign aggesssion that Japan, from sheer motives of self-preservation, was constrained to entrench herself in some of the regions from which she had ejected the aggressor. 183

Not unlike Manchuria, the 'China War' also began with an 'incident' - this time with a clash between Sino-Japanese faces at the Marco Polo bridge near Peking on July 7, 1937. A second clash occurred on July 10 and on July 26 Japanese troops were launched to drive Chinese forces out of the Peking-Tientsin area. Chiang Kai-Shek responded with the total mobilization of his forces to meet the Japanese action. Less than a month later Japan carried the war to central China by landing troops in Shanghai and launching a full scale attack on the Kuomintang. The undeclared China War had begun, with Japanese public opinion supporting the Army.

When the Japanese military commenced their undeclared war against China in

183. Ishii, p. 113

July, 1937, they had the support and justification of a substantial portion of Japanese public opinion. Conditions were such that expansion seemed to offer the only hope of salvation. The home islands were growing over populated; all arable land was being farmed; raw materials were sorely needed for the expansion of old and new industries; Japan was finding it increasingly difficult to dispose of its goods in foreign markets owing to world conditions which raised barriers against Japan's products; and the prospects of Japan's being forced to reduce its standard of living with a resultant loss of prestige among the Powers were serious. The solution to Japan's problems appeared to lie in expansion. Manchukuo was obviously not enough. 184

Throughout September of 1937 both the United States and the League directed repeated protests at Japan citing violations of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Open-Door policy in China. The following month a League advisory committee recommended a meeting of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty at Brussels to determine if Japan had violated the pact. The Japanese foreign office refused the invitation stating that "as compared with the time when the Nine Power Treaty was concluded, the situation in East Asia has been rendered totally different ..." ¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, Japan's attendance would have been contrary to her policy of

184. Battistini, p. 173.

185. H. S. Quigley, The Far Eastern War p. 53.

direct Sino-Japanese settlement of questions relating to the Far East. Japan now was conveying to the powers the message that a new situation existed in that region and former treaties were thus no longer valid. As Tatsuo Kawa explains:

Japan's position as the stabilizing force in East Asia is itself a mission of historical significance which must cause the natural extinction of the Nine Power Treaty. That is, between 1922 and the Present when Japan's Axes have been completed there have occurred drastic changes the world over, and it is not possible to settle any Asiatic problem without recognizing Japan's new position in the northern Pacific. The axes of new Japan symbolize a moral obligation not to leave China a prize for endless international rivalries but to rescue her from the state of quasi-colony of Occidental Powers. 186

The Powers, however, were not willing to recognize or acknowledge any new situation nor were they prepared to accord Japan consistent status treatment on both regional and world levels. At the Conference the powers condemned Japan for violating the Nine Power Treaty; for refusing to negotiate at the international level; and by accusing Japan of trying to destroy China.

186. Tatsuo Kawai, p. 111.

1938 - 1941

Despite initial victories Japanese forces met with considerable, unexpected resistance from Chinese troops and the China War was reaching a stalemate by mid-1938. The United States opened the year by issuing four protests between January and April citing further violations of the Open Door, and by July the U.S. began to apply the first stage of economic pressure on Japan in the form of a "moral embargo." The moral embargo effectively prevented the export of aircraft equipment and aerial bombs from the United States to Japan.¹⁸⁷ Although Japan still could get oil, copper, scrap iron and steel from the U.S. she responded to the economic sanction by signing a commercial treaty with Italy on July 5, 1938.¹⁸⁸

In mid-September the League Council invited Japan to attend a meeting at Geneva under Article 17 of the League Covenant. The Japanese Foreign Office refused the invitation claiming that the League, by invoking Article 17 had effectively recognized a state of war between Japan and China which Japan claimed did not exist.¹⁸⁹

The official Japanese government response to the League was a telegram written by Foreign Minister Ugaki which stated:

187. The moral embargo amounted to a presidential request of private companies not to export to Japan materials which could be used in the bombing of civilians, and preceded the Licensing Act.

188. Jones, p. 134.

189. Ibid, p. 136.

The Imperial Government is firmly convinced that means such as those laid down in the Covenant cannot provide a just and adequate solution of the present conflict between Japan and China, and its attitude in this connection has been clearly stated on many occasions. I have therefore the honor to inform you that, for this reason, the Imperial Government regrets its inability to accept the Council's invitation.¹⁹⁰

In a further note on October 3, 1938 the Japanese Foreign Office informed the League of Japan's intention to withdraw from the social and technical fields of the League. In part it stated that:

... For the sake of world peace, Japan, after her withdrawal from the League, has continued to cooperate with that body in social and technical fields. However, the League's organs even in these spheres have, since the outbreak of the present affair, gone beyond their proper duties and assumed a greatly deplorable attitude of indulging in political discussions and of slandering at every turn the actions of Japan in China. Now the adoption by the Council of the report concerning sanctions against Japan has made clear the irreconcilability between the positions of Japan and the League, as a result of which Japan cannot but find it difficult to maintain the policy of co-operation she has hitherto pursued toward the League. The Japanese Government regret the decision which the League Council, misled by intrigues of certain powers, has reached.¹⁹¹

Thus, while Japan had been formally invited to Geneva she felt slighted by the treatment accorded her by the League.

190. Cited in Quigley, Far Eastern War, p. 328.

191. Ibid, p. 329.

On November 2, 1938 Japan formally withdrew from all ties with the social and technical branches of the League.¹⁹² Clearly there existed differing perceptions of the situation in China. While the Powers condemned Japan for aggressive acts violating the Nine Power Treaty and the Open Door, Yosuke Matsuoka, who became foreign minister in 1940, explained Japan's position in China:

For what then is Japan fighting? She is fighting simply for her conception of her mission in Asia. There is the whole answer. She is fighting to keep Asia from becoming another Africa and ... to save China from the death grip of the Comintern ... Billions of yen, thousands of her young men's lives - all are offerings on the altar of her own convictions and aspirations. She is simply footing the bill which the leadership of Asian races calls for. No treasure trove is in her eyes - only sacrifice upon sacrifice. No one realizes this more than she does. But her very life depends on it as do those of her neighbours as well.¹⁹³

Despite the conquests of Canton and Hankow Japan in the autumn of 1938 still could not break down the resistance of Chinese forces and Japan's attention began to shift to Southeast Asia and the creation of a 'New Order' in an attempt to supplement vital materials normally imported from the U.S. or Europe. To this end the government of Prime Minister Konoye on November 3, 1938 announced the creation

192. Jones, p. 136.

193. Quigley, p. 57.

of a "New Order in East Asia" which formally posited Japanese leadership of the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc. In part the government statement read:

What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will ensure the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of our present military campaign. The new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchukuo and China in political, economic, cultural and other fields... The establishment of a new order in East Asia is in complete conformity with the very spirit in which the Empire was founded; to achieve the task is the exalted responsibility with which our present generation is entrusted. It is therefore imperative to carry out ... at all costs this duty incumbent upon our nation. ¹⁹⁴

The government announcement also stated that Japan would not cease her current struggle until all anti-Japanese forces in China had been crushed. But the continuing struggle would require additional resources to sustain it and the markets of southeast Asia became increasingly attractive. During November and December the United States and Japan held talks during which Foreign Minister Arita stressed that Japan was involved in a struggle "whose outcome involved her survival as a great power," and that Japan intended to "monopolize such products and industries," as she considered essential to her economy and the success of her struggle. ¹⁹⁵

194. Royama, p. 145-146.

195. Jones, p. 137.

Thus, as Iriye points out, after 1938 the southward advance became:

a basic Japanese policy. The objective was to create an economically self-sufficient and militarily impregnable defensive state. The bloc embracing Japan-Manchuria-China was obviously far from being self-sufficient. From this point of view there was a logical necessity to include southeast Asia with its rich mineral and vegetable resources in the Japanese Empire. Such a new order would help reduce Japan's dependence on supplies of oil, iron and other minerals.¹⁹⁶

U.S. - Japanese talks did not go well in the final two months of 1938. Arita had stressed that Japan would devote all her energies to the creation of the new order. Japan's claim, he contended, was based on the principle that a new order now existed in East Asia and that the powers would have to accept the fact that the Open Door concept and the treaties supporting it were obsolete. Arita had not said that Japan would forbid foreign commercial or financial activity by the powers in China - only that such participation would be on Japan's terms as leader of the new order. The year ended with a categorical refusal by the U.S. to recognize Japan's regional role or any new order and the talks collapsed.

196. Iriye, p. 207, cf also fn 204.

The year 1939 opened with Great Britain and France following the U.S. lead in refusing to recognize the new order and protesting violations of the Nine Power Treaty. Thus they too refused to recognize Japan's announced regional role. The U.S. in January also transferred its fleet from the Atlantic to Pacific waters. The three countries reinforced their opposition to the announcement of the new order by extending additional aid to the Chinese Nationalist government.¹⁹⁷ In December, 1938 the United States had advanced \$25 million to the Nationalists for the purchase of lorries and gasoline for use on the new Burma Road - an alternative trade route running from Kuming to Lashio.¹⁹⁸ Great Britain followed the U.S. lead with a £ 450,000 credit. During the 1937-1939 period the Soviet Union had also extended \$250 million in credits to China in addition to materials and technical assistance. In Japan the continued Chinese resistance was attributed to the assistance of these powers, intensifying the already frustrating situation which existed in Japan.

Not only was Western assistance to China regarded as interference with legitimate Japanese aims and hence a status slight but so too was any suggestion of third party mediation in the dispute. Japan's rationale for refusing such intervention reveals something of Japan's self perception. Addressing the 38th Liaison Conference on July 10,

197. Jones, p. 139.

198. Ibid, p. 139.

1941 Matsuoka brushed aside suggestions of third party mediators stating that such claims used: "as a precedent the times when we sought the aid of third parties, including the United States, in the peace negotiations during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars; but they forget the position that the Empire occupies thirty years later."¹⁹⁹

In February 1939, Japan occupied Hainan Island and the Spratley Islands the following month. The advance was continued with the proclamation of Japanese jurisdiction over the Sinan Islands. In doing so the Japanese had rejected a French claim to sovereignty and the U.S. promptly invoked the non-recognition doctrine. On May 11, 1939 the pro-Japanese council chairman on the island settlement of Kulangsu was assassinated and Japan seized the opportunity to land marines and demanded that the council at the international settlement be Japanese controlled. The U.S., Great Britain and France responded not only by rejecting the demand and protesting the landing of marines but also by sending warships and landing parties of sailors. Japan in turn denounced this as constituting an unfriendly act.

The following month the Japanese renewed their drive into southern China and blocked the British and French concessions at Tientsin. In the ensuing negotiations Japan

199. Ike, Japan's Decision, p. 97.

demanded that the British cease assisting the Nationalist government in China in areas occupied by Japan and to desist from obstructing Japanese objectives there.²⁰⁰ On July 24, the British agreed that the Japanese army had the right to secure the area under its control and that it was justified in taking action to prevent obstruction.

The United States strenuously objected to this agreement and two days later gave this opposition practical effect by announcing the abrogation of the 1911 U.S. - Japanese commercial treaty. This action by the United States was received in Japan as constituting a further interference with her struggle to assume the leadership of Asia since:

... the war effort against China was highly dependent on certain materials being received from the United States, Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific.²⁰¹

When the European war erupted in September 1939, Japan took the opportunity to warn the powers that the continued presence of their warships and troops in China could compromise Japan's neutrality in the conflict. The United States responded by stating that American forces would remain and by extending the moral embargo in December to include, "all plans, plants, manufacturing rights and technical information required for the production of high quality aviation gasoline ..."²⁰² After this added economic

200. Ibid, p. 144.

201. Battistini, p. 158.

202. Ibid, p. 161.

pressure and the threat of economic sanctions, the markets and resources of southeast Asia came to be viewed as essential to Japan's continuing struggle for the leadership of Asia.

THE ELIMINATION OF ALTERNATIVES AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

The year 1940 opened with the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime under Japanese tutelage at Nanking. The United States protested the creation of another Manchukuo, invoked the non-recognition doctrine and reaffirmed its allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek with a further \$100,000,000 loan to China in March. The following month Great Britain followed suit by refusing to recognize the new regime and reaffirming its allegiance to Chaing.

German victories in Europe and the occupation of the Netherlands in the late spring of 1940 encouraged Japan to extend her activities to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies in search of greater supplies of essential raw materials and the expansion of economic opportunities. The United States issued an immediate warning against any such advance, citing the Root-Takahira agreement and the Four Power Treaty. The United States of course was duly concerned with the effect of Japan's planned southern expansion on British possessions which were seen to be essential not only

to Britain's survival but also to U.S. security.²⁰³

The fall of Holland, Belgium and France and the opening of the Battle of Britain allowed Japan a freer hand in operationalizing these plans, and increased U.S. concern.

In June of 1940 Foreign Minister Arita in a radio address declared that:

Japan is now engaged in the task of establishing a new order in East Asia ... The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are geographically, historically, racially and economically very closely related to one another. They are destined to cooperate and minister to one another's needs for their common well being and prosperity, and to promote peace and progress in their regions. The uniting of all these regions under a single sphere on the basis of common existence and insuring thereby the stability of that sphere is, I think, a natural conclusion ... I desire to declare that the destiny of these regions - any development therein and any disposal thereof - is a matter of grave concern to Japan in view of her mission and responsibility as the stabilizing force in East Asia.²⁰⁴

Thus the Japanese government had expanded its program for a 'new order' in East Asia to 'Greater East Asia' and German victories instilled confidence in new opportunities for continental expansion.

With France fallen and Britain battling Germany in the air, Japan was in a position to press its demands for concessions in southeast Asia. Britain was forced to suspend

203. Iriye, p. 205.

204. Quigley, p. 182.

the flow of supplies to Nationalist China from Hong Kong and Burma while French Indo-China was threatened with military action if supplies to China did not cease. The war offered Japan the opportunity at least to restrict the level of foreign interference with her regional objectives.

In July, Prince Konoye became Prime Minister, appointing Matsuoka Yosuke as his foreign minister, and General Tojo as War Minister. The cabinet endorsed the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity' plan, decided to be firm with the U.S. in this regard, to work more closely with Germany and Italy, if possible come to terms with Russia, and to adopt a stronger policy in French Indo-China and Indonesia.²⁰⁵

The same month the National Defence Act was passed in the United States allowing President Roosevelt to intensify the economic pressure on Japan by placing under license all arms, amunition and implements of war. Also placed under license were certain basic raw materials such as aluminium, aircraft parts, equipment and accessories, armour plate, glass, plastics, machine tools, scrap iron and petroleum and the export of aviation gasoline was limited to Western Hemisphere nations only.²⁰⁶

The resources of southeast Asia thus assumed an

205. Brown, p. 216.

206. Iriye, p. 173.

even greater importance to Japan and her 'mission'. Japan continued its southward drive and on September 22, 1940 signed an agreement with the Vichy government allowing the stationing of Japanese armed forces in Indo-China. The Japanese government announced that:

France has agreed to afford in French Indo-China all such facilities of a military nature as are required by the Japanese army and navy for executing their campaign for the settlement of the China affair.²⁰⁷

On September 27, 1940 Japan joined the Axis - a full military alliance with Germany and Italy, anti-American in content and designed to prevent U.S. entry into the war. The Japanese inner cabinet had been in almost continuous session since the spring of 1939 to consider such an alliance and on July 17, 1940, in face of increasing opposition from the U.S. and Britain, Konoye, Matsuoka, Tojo and Navy Minister Yoshida had agreed that Japanese-German ties would have to be strengthened if Japan was to create the new order in Greater East Asia. They had also decided that the British, French and Dutch colonies in that sphere were to be incorporated into the New Order and that Japan would protect the New Order from U.S. interference, by force if necessary.²⁰⁸ The Axis alliance provided for military assistance in the event Japan failed to restrain the

207. Quigley, p. 185.

208. David J. Lu, p. 100-102; Jones, p. 194-195.

United States. Through the alliance Japan also found 'friends' to recognize her regional position and the New Order. In return she recognized German-Italian leadership of a new order in Europe.

That Japan and Germany should be drawn together in this way was not a startling event. German-Japanese relations had been quite cordial during the inter-war period. Germany's post-war economic recovery had been rapid and German-Japanese trade had increased considerably during this period. In 1927 a new German-Japanese Commercial Treaty had been concluded with favorable terms for Japan with regard to import duties. The same year, a German-Japanese cultural institute had been established in Tokyo. Moreover Germany had refused to participate in the Brussels Conference thus showing its support for Japan's China policy and in 1938 Hitler committed Germany to the recognition of Manchukuo.

At a cabinet meeting on September 4, 1940 Konoye, Tojo, Matsuoka and Navy Vice-Minister Sumiyama drew up a plan of the most desirable post war world order. They saw the world as divided into three blocs - an American, European and Asian, each of which would be self-controlled and self-regulated. The three regional leaders would be Japan in Asia, the United States, and probably Germany in Europe, and thus they considered the (then proposed) alliance to be

in Japan's best interests given the prevailing conditions.

While of the opinion that the alliance was in the country's best interest, Japanese decision-makers were also aware that Japan would have to pay a price for the alliance. It was felt that when the alliance was made public the U.S. would react by increasing her interference with Japan's Asian role and that Japan would have to adopt a stronger stand against such action, as the following discussion shows.

President of the Privy Council Hara: ... when Japan's position becomes clear with the announcement of this Pact, (the United States) will greatly increase her pressure on us, she will greatly step up her aid to Chiang, and she will obstruct Japan's war effort.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka: What the President of the Privy Council says is quite true. ... At present American sentiment against Japan has become stronger, and this cannot be remedied by a few conciliatory gestures. Only a firm stand on our part will prevent war. 209

As expected the United States however did not share the same desired outcome and in response to the Axis Alliance ordered its fleet to remain in the Pacific and sent aircraft and submarine reinforcements to Manila. In October the U.S. extended a further \$100,000,000 credit to China and announced the 'lend-lease' program to assist nations fighting the Axis and their allies. The U.S. again

209. Ike, Japan's Decision, p. 10. This conversation took place at the Imperial Conference of September 19, 1940.

accused Japan of violating the Open Door and the Nine Power Treaty and limited the shipment of scrap metal to the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain, ignoring Japanese protestations against unfriendly acts.

U.S. interference with Japanese objectives intensified in the closing months of 1940. In November the American government promised further aid to China in addition to supplying the Nationalists with new aircraft and allowing, for the first time, Americans to go to China as aviators or instructors. In December additional planes and ships were dispatched to the Philippines and iron, steel and specific kinds of machinery, equipment and plans for the production of aviation lubricating oil were added to the licensing system.

By the end of 1940 the effects of the U.S. abrogation of the U.S.-Japanese commercial treaty were acutely felt, particularly in naval circles. Oil supplies in Japan were dwindling and it was felt that if the American market should be completely closed to Japan only the Dutch East Indies could supply oil in the quantity needed as the following exchange demonstrated:

Navy Chief of Staff Prince Fushimi: I foresee that as a result of this alliance our trade with Great Britain and the United States will undergo a change; and that if worst comes to worst, it will become increasingly difficult to import vital materials.

Prime Minister Konoye: We can anticipate that trade relations with Britain and the United States will deteriorate even more. If worst comes to worst, it may become impossible to obtain any imported goods.

Director of the Planning Board Hoshino: Since it is of course impossible to meet Army, Navy, Government and civilian needs from production within the Yen bloc and by drawing on our stockpiles, it will ultimately be necessary to work out a way of obtaining oil from ... the Netherlands East Indies.

Fushimi: In the end we will need to get oil from the Netherlands East Indies. There are two ways of getting it - by peaceful means, and by the use of force. The Navy very much prefers peaceful means.²¹⁰

In the face of intensified interference with her objectives Japan adopted a sterner posture in her southward advance. The Konoye government formally announced the establishment of a co-prosperity sphere which would embrace French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlement, British Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines, British Borneo and Burma with the Japan-Manchuria-China as the core.

However the government of the Indies was under the command of the Netherlands government in exile in London and Japan was able to secure only one-half of the oil supply considered necessary and only for a period of six months.²¹¹ The oil was to be supplied by Anglo-Dutch and U.S. companies - but would not include oil of high octane rating needed for immediate use by Japanese airplanes. In December 1940 the

210. Ike, p. 5-8.

211. Quigley, p. 187.

Netherlands government in exile announced that the Dutch East Indies would not and could not become part of the co-prosperity sphere.

The Dutch East Indies also reneged on earlier promised exports of tin and rubber and Japanese leaders felt this was done at the urging of the British and U.S. governments and was thus a serious status slight. The matter was discussed at the 25th Liaison Conference held on May 22, 1941 where the following exchange occurred.

Matsuoka: These recent developments suggest that (the Netherlands East Indies) may eventually embargo even tin and rubber. It seems that they are taking advantage of Japan's plight and treating us like a minor power.

Someone: ... but it is British and American support that allows the East Indies to take such an attitude.

Matsuoka: Today I am going to summon the British Ambassador (Sir Robert Craigie) ... and warn him that serious consequences may ensue, depending upon the British Government's attitude. I think we have put up with it long enough, and that the time for action has come. If the Netherlands East Indies persist in their present attitude, many of our people will feel a righteous indignation; and I as Foreign Minister, will sympathize with them.²¹²

At the 29th Liaison Conference held on June 11, 1941 Matsuoka announced Japan's intention to recall its mission from the Netherlands East Indies because negotiations were making little progress. In making the announcement Matsuoka stated that:

212. Ike, p. 38.

Judging from developments to date, I would say the Netherlands East Indies have insulted the Imperial Government. Therefore, it seems necessary for Japan to take a stronger attitude in putting an end to the negotiations. 213

Early in 1941 Konoye sent Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, a good friend of Roosevelt's, to the U.S. to solicit American understanding of and acquiescence to the Japanese program of expansion. The Japanese demands which Nomura presented to the President and State Department officials included: the cessation of U.S. support of China; an easing of the U.S. economic embargo and U.S. opposition to Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact; and a halt to U.S. demands that Japan withdraw from Indo-China.²¹⁴

During the negotiations Japan stepped up efforts in Indo-China. At Japanese urging Thai forces, in March 1941, engaged French troops over disputed territory in southwestern Indo-China. The Japanese government offered to mediate the hostilities and amassed a considerable portion of the Japanese fleet in the Gulf of Siam to encourage French acquiescence to the terms of the mediation.

213. Ike, p. 49.

214. Ike. p. 53.

Under the terms of the settlement Thailand acquired portions of Laos, and about one-third of Cambodia and Japan was to act as the guarantor of the settlement. Furthermore both disputants were bound not to enter into any agreement with a third power whose actions would be prejudicial to Japanese ambitions.²¹⁵

The following month Japan and Russia signed a non-aggression pact which freed Japan from the worry over the Siberian-Manchukuo border problem and allowed her to concentrate on the expansion into Southeast Asia and the East Indies in search of needed resources.

By May, 1941 the talks in Washington had reached an impasse with Nomura's announcement of the Konoye principles, designed to grant Japan a special position in China and extensive economic rights in the much desired southwestern Pacific. The United States rejected the proposals on the grounds that they constituted violations of the Open Door and the supporting treaties - thus again refusing to recognize Japan's new order and her dominant regional position.

Faced with continued interference with her ambition of creating a co-prosperity sphere with Japan as leader and desperately in need of additional resources an Imperial Conference was assembled on July 2, 1941.

215. Quigley, p. 186-187,

The conference agreed to continued southward advancement - a military drive into the southwestern Pacific. Records of the Imperial Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conferences between July 2 and December 1 confirm the Japanese perception of their activities as legitimate aims and that opposition from Britain and the United States was perceived as unjustified interference with these aims.

The "Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation" presented to the Conference stated in part that:

In order to guarantee the security and preservation of the nation, our Empire will continue all necessary diplomatic negotiations with reference to the southern regions, and will also take such other measures as may be necessary.²¹⁶

The notions of security and equality were also evident in Conference discussions. Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Nagano raised the point that defensive action by Japan was needed to survive and stressed attaining a "position of self-sufficiency within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."²¹⁷ A kind of circular reasoning is also evident in conference discussions, i.e., it was recognized that Japan needed certain materials to successfully

216. Ike, p. 78.

217. Ibid, p. 81.

wage war in China and to defend against other powers and to create the new order. If Japan was refused access to these materials then she might have to go to war to obtain them. In reference to the interference encountered from Britain the United States and the Netherlands, Nagano stated that:

... Great Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands are currently stepping up their pressure against Japan. If they obstinately continue to obstruct us, and if our Empire finds itself unable to cope with this, we may, it must be anticipated, finally have to go to war with Great Britain and the United States.²¹⁸

Thus the Japanese perceived their aims as legitimate and which would have to be defended. Indicative of Japan's determination is Konoye's statement that Japan's "... national policy should not be altered in the least by changes and developments in the world situation."²¹⁹

The 38th and 39th Liaison Conferences of July 10, 1941 convened to discuss U.S.-Japanese relations in light of the U.S. reply to Japanese demands presented by Nomura. The U.S. note was accompanied by an 'Oral Statement' from Secretary Hull which stated in part that while the U.S. wished peace between the two countries, there were:

... some Japanese leaders in influential official positions (committed to the support

218. Ike, p. 293.

219. Ibid, p. 80.

Nazi Germany) and so long as such leaders maintain this attitude in their official positions and apparently seek to influence public opinion in Japan in the direction indicated, is it not illusory to expect that adoption of a proposal such as the one under consideration offers a basis for achieving substantial results along the described lines? 220

The reference to 'some Japanese leaders' was aimed at Matsuoka and aroused the anger of the foreign minister and other Japanese officials. At the July 10 Conference both Matsuoka and Saito Yoshie, his Foreign Office advisor, responded to the U.S. reply. In part Saito stated that:

I have studied the present proposal and find many reasons ... why it is unacceptable... It is obvious that America sent it after consultation with Britain and China. Thus I think the countries that are for the status quo are getting together to put pressure on Japan. On the matter of Sino-Japanese negotiations, the United States hopes to make us negotiate on the basis of conditions existing prior to the China incident. ... The Americans think that Manchuria should revert to China ... This proposal does not recognize the stationing of troops in China to maintain peace and order; it seeks the unconditional withdrawal of all troops. The stationing of troops to maintain peace and order is a most important element in our national policy. ... America's intention is to bring about peace between Japan and China by means of an agreement between Japan and the United States, and then to let Japan and China negotiate directly within

220. Ibid, p. 93.

the limits thus set. This procedure will transfer leadership in East Asia to the United States. It will interfere with the implementation of an independent policy by our Empire. ... Hull's 'Oral Statement' contains especially outrageous language. ... His attitude is one of contempt for Japan. ... This language is not the kind one would use toward a country of equal standing. It expresses an attitude one would take toward a protectorate or a possession. These words are inexcusable.²²¹

Matsuoka then stated that he agreed with Saito's report and added that:

... Hull's 'Statement' is outrageous. Never has such a thing occurred since Japan opened diplomatic relations with other countries.²²²

At the 39th Liaison Conference the U.S. note and 'Oral Statement' were again discussed.

Matsuoka: The 'Oral Statement' ... is indeed absurd. I have thought about it ... and I feel that the United States regards Japan as either her protectorate or her dependency; and that so long as we are not going to submit to this sort of judgement we should not accept the statement. ... The 'Statement' considers Japan a weak, dependent country.²²³

Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama: I myself agree with the foreign minister's views. ...²²⁴

War Minister Tojo: ... it will be intolerable if we cannot establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and settle the China Incident. ... since the 'Oral Statement' affects the dignity of our national polity, I believe we cannot help but reject it, in line with the Foreign Minister's judgement.²²⁵

221. Ibid, p. 97.

222. Ibid, p. 97.

223. Ibid, p. 99.

224. Ibid, p. 100.

225. Ibid, p. 102.

Thus it was decided that Japan should reject U.S. demands and be determined to continue the southward advance. The Japanese were still relatively confident that the Axis Alliance would deter U.S. entry into the war and that Japan could realize her ambitions.

On July 23 Japan began taking the first concrete steps to force French officials in Indo-China to grant additional bases in the south. In accordance with an agreement with the Vichy government Japanese warships and transports began appearing off the southern coast and landings began. Japanese troops began to garrison strategic centres in the central and southern province. The United States however, having broken Japan's diplomatic code, knew of Japanese plans and had decided to take deterrence action to force Japan to halt her advance. On July 25, the United States responded by freezing all Japanese assets in the United States, virtually ceasing trade between the two countries.

By this action about 75 percent of Japan's total imports outside the Yen bloc area were shut off.²²⁶

By August 1, 1941 this had been extended to a complete oil embargo. On July 26, 1941 Great Britain followed suit and froze all Japanese assets as did India and Burma.

226. Battistini, p. 166.

On July 28, the Netherlands followed the example, thus "cutting off Japan's last important source of oil vital to the military effort."

The effect of the economic blockade was acutely felt in Japan. Warehouses piled up with surplus quantities of raw silk, cotton mills closed down and for a nation so dependent on foreign trade the embargo had created a disastrous situation.

The freezing of Japanese assets by these countries left Japan to face basically three alternatives, (1) abandon the China War and the gains to date, (2) invade southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific for needed materials and risk war with the United States, or (3) pursue further negotiations. The Japanese chose to pursue the latter two alternatives simultaneously.

On July 29, 1941 Japanese forces occupied Cam Ranh Naval base - 800 miles from Manila, Hong Kong and Singapore and air bases were established along the borders of the colony. Immediately planes, tanks and artillery were landed. All these steps were within the parameters of the agreement with the Vichy government - until Japan tripled the number of troops in the colony from the 40,000 stipulated by the agreement to 125,000.

The result was the transfer of authority from the Indo-Chinese government to the Japanese; the French military

forces were disbanded; costs of occupation were paid for by the Bank of Indo-China; all export except that with Japan was prohibited and large tracts of cotton and rubber producing land were requisitioned.²²⁷

Thailand, despite the friendship treaty, proved a more difficult situation, by refusing to be drawn into the co-prosperity sphere, and secure in the assurances by Great Britain and the United States that they would come to its support if Japanese troops crossed the border.

Western assurances to Thailand through the Atlantic Charter were perceived in Japan as constituting patent interferences with Japanese objectives and as a threat to the security of the Japanese Empire. In August, Japanese Home Secretary Admiral N. Suetsugu stated the Japanese view to the Associated Press, stating that:

Consciously or not, America seems inspired by the inhuman motive of holding us down in a subordinate position to herself and seeks to justify such a policy by the specious plea of defending the American ideal of peace and democracy ... For this reason we conceived the prosperity sphere, which therefore is nothing but the child of Anglo-Saxon oppressive interference. The sphere is designed as a political and economic guarantee for independent existence of the Asiatic races, with the Japanese taking the leadership. It is passive, limitative, and defensive, and certainly not exclusive.²²⁸

227. Quigley, p. 185.

228. Cited in Quigley, p. 193.

On August 16 a policy paper was prepared by a joint conference of Army and Navy section chiefs in response to the embargo. The policy document entitled "The Essentials For Carrying Out The Empires Policies" was presented to the 50th Liaison Conference on September 3. The Navy's perception of the new conditions created by U.S. interference was presented at the Conference by Admiral Nagano:

The Empire is losing materials: that is, we are getting weaker. By contrast the enemy is getting stronger. Although I am confident that at the present time we have a chance to win a war, I fear this opportunity will disappear with the passage of time ... I think it will be a long war. Hence, we must be prepared for a long war ... If we cannot obtain ... resources, it will not be possible to carry on a long war. It is important to make preparations so that we will not be defeated, by getting essential resources. In short, our armed forces have no alternative but to try to avoid being pushed into a corner, to keep in our hands the power to decide when to begin hostilities and thus seize the initiative. There is no alternative but to push forward in this way.²²⁹

The conference decision was ratified by the full cabinet on September 4, and at an Imperial Conference two days later.

Konoye at this time had suggested that he meet privately with Roosevelt to discuss U.S.-Japanese relations in view of recent actions. Roosevelt refused however on the grounds that such a meeting would be of no use unless

229. Ike, p. 131.

agreement could first be reached on specific issues.

The rejection of the Konoye proposal indicated a hardening of the U.S. position. Roosevelt had received the Nomura mission in February to discuss U.S.-Japanese relations, but rejected a proposed visit by the country's Prime Minister six months later.

Another Imperial Conference was assembled on September 6 and adopted the policy of continued negotiations with the U.S. and preparation for war. In return for the lifting of the oil embargo the Conference showed Japan willing to cease further southward advances and to withdraw forces from Indochine "after a just peace has been established in East Asia."²³⁰ These concessions were interconnected:

... since we promise not to use military force in the south, we must put China under the complete control of our Empire. To do that, it is absolutely essential to station the necessary forces there. China will not listen to us if we withdraw all our forces. Japan will not be able to survive (even though) our Army has sacrificed hundreds of thousands of men.²³¹

The U.S. however clung to its demand for Japan's recognition of the Chiang regime and the withdrawal of Japanese troops.

230. Ibid, p. 136.

231. Ibid, p. 160.

A number of statements made at this conference reveal how Japanese leaders perceived their country's position in the international situation in 1941 and the alternatives available later. Three such statements are presented here in abbreviated form.

Prime Minister Konoye: As you all know, the international situation in which we are involved has become increasingly strained ... Under these circumstances our Empire must, of course, quickly prepare to meet any situation that may occur, and at the same time it must try to prevent the disaster of war by resorting to all possible diplomatic measures. If the diplomatic measures should fail to bring about favorable results within a certain period I believe we cannot help but take the ultimate step in order to *defend ourselves*.²³²

Navy Chief of Staff Nagano: ... the Supreme Command believes, from the standpoint of operations, that we cannot avoid being finally reduced to a crippled nation (if we delay too long). A number of vital military supplies including oil, are dwindling day by day. This will cause a gradual weakening of our national defense, and lead to a situation in which if we maintain the status quo, the capacity of our Empire to act will be reduced in the days to come. Meanwhile the defenses of American, British and other foreign military facilities and vital points in the Far East, are strengthened with great speed. Accordingly, if our minimum demands which are necessary for the self-preservation and self-defense of our Empire, cannot be attained through diplomacy, and ultimately we cannot avoid war, we must make all preparations ... ²³³

Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama: The Army is in complete agreement with the statement that has just been made by the Navy Chief of Staff. ... If we remain idle and mark time in these passive circumstances, and if we let ourselves be trapped by the intrigues of Great Britain and the United States,

232. Ike, p. 138.

233. Ibid, p. 139.

our national defense capability will decline as time goes on; by contrast the military preparedness of Great Britain and the United States, and other countries will be gradually strengthened.²³⁴

While U.S.-Japanese negotiations continued the racial issue, which had remained a central theme in Japan's international relations, was raised at an Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941. Addressing the Conference Privy Council President Hara stated:

At the last Imperial Conference it was decided that we would go to war if the negotiations failed to lead to an agreement. ... (but) what we should always keep in mind here is what would happen to relations between Germany and Great Britain and Germany and the United States, all of them being countries whose population belongs to the whole race, if Japan should enter the war. Hitler has said that the Japanese are a second-class race and Germany has not declared war against the United States. Japan will take positive action against the United States. In that event, will the American people adopt the same attitude toward us psychologically that they do toward the Germans? Their indignation against the Japanese will be stronger than their hatred of Hitler. ... We must be prepared for the possibility that hatred of the yellow race might shift the hatred now being directed against Germany to Japan, thus resulting in the German-British war's being turned against Japan. ...we must give serious consideration to race relations, exercise constant care to avoid being surrounded by the entire Aryan race - which would leave Japan isolated... ²³⁵

On November 20, Prime Minister Tojo²³⁶ sent Japan's final set of proposals for peaceful settlement to the United States.

234. Ibid, p. 141.

235. Ibid, p. 237.

236. Tojo had replaced Konoye as Prime Minister on October 17 retained his post as War Minister and named Togo Shigenori as his Foreign Minister.

Included in the proposals were:

- 1) That Japan and the U.S. would refrain from taking any further advances in southeast Asia and the south Pacific;
- 2) Japan would withdraw its troops from Indo-China after a general peace had been reached with China;
- 3) Japan and the U.S. would co-operate in securing commodities in the Dutch East Indies;
- 4) commercial relations were to be restored to the status prior to the freeze and the U.S. would supply the required quantities of oil to Japan
- 5) the U.S. would cease all assistance to China.

The United States not only rejected these proposals but the next day, November 26, presented an alternative set of proposals which in fact demanded a return to the pre-1931 status quo.²³⁷

In addition to Hull's general principles for peace in the Pacific, Japan was asked to enter a multilateral non-aggression pact with the United States, the British Empire, China, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union and Thailand. And Japan was to withdraw its military forces from China and Indo-China and enter an international agreement to respect the territorial integrity of China and Japan was to recognize the Kuomintang government of China.²³⁸

The acceptance of these proposals in the Japanese view would have meant giving up any claim to Great Power

237. Iriye, p. 219.

238. Quigley, p. 225.

status or great power ambitions and admitting that her actions to date had in fact been unlawful. The discussion at the Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941 clearly presents the Japanese perception of their country's position and the treatment accorded it by the other powers.

Prime Minister Tojo: The United States not only refused to make even one concession with respect to the position she had maintained in the past, but also stipulated new conditions, after having formed an alliance with Great Britain, the Netherlands and China. The United States demanded complete and unconditional withdrawal of troops from China, withdrawal of our recognition of the Nanking Government, and the reduction of the Tripartite Pact to a dead letter. This not only belittled the dignity of our Empire and made it impossible for us to harvest the fruits of the China Incident, but also threatened the very existence of our Empire. It became quite clear that we could not achieve our goals by means of diplomacy. 239

Foreign Minister Togo: ... Our reply to this (the U.S. proposal) was that it was inconsistent for the United States to continue to give aid to Chiang and obstruct the establishment of peace ... The United States has persistently adhered to its traditional doctrines and principles, ignored the realities in East Asia, and *tried to force on our Empire principles that she herself could not easily carry out.* I believe that America's policy toward Japan has ... been to thwart the establishment of a New Order in East Asia, which is our immutable policy. We must recognize that if we were to accept their present proposal, the international position of our Empire would be reduced to a status lower than it was prior to the Manchurian Incident, and our very survival would inevitably be threatened. ... Britain and the United States would gain control over those regions (Manchuria, China). The prestige of our Empire would fall to the ground and our role as stabilizer would be destroyed. 240

239. Ibid, p. 263.

240. Ibid, p. 271.

Prime Minister Tojo: When we take an overall view of popular opinion relating to Japanese-American problems, we conclude that the people in general are aware that our nation, in view of the present world situation, stands at a crossroad, one road leads to glory and the other to decline. They have shown an extraordinary interest in the diplomatic negotiations being carried out by the Government. ... they are prepared to accept (war) as an inevitable development. They are displaying the spirit characteristic of the Japanese people; and they are truly determined to undergo all manner of hardships, and to overcome adversity by united action. ... The so-called nationalistic organizations ... even the owners of small and medium-sized enterprises ... the laboring and peasant classes - are clearly aware of the position in which our country finds itself. It appears they want the Government to take an unambiguous position in executing a strong policy. 241

At the end of the Conference, the final imperial approval for war was obtained. At 7:50 a.m. (Honolulu time) on Sunday, December 7, 1941 the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

241. Ibid, p. 272.

CONCLUSION

If war is not an accidental occurrence then one assumes that there exist discernible patterns in the relations among and between nations which involve violence. The task confronting the social scientist or historian concerned with the origins of war is the discovery of these patterns. The more knowledge generated about the causes of war, the better able people, whether scholars, policy-makers or statesmen, will be able to understand and prevent warfare.

This study has attempted to understand and explain the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 through the use of two central themes, lateral pressure and status inconsistency. The study has also attempted to draw on diplomatic history, in particular to probe the possible consequences of a particular kind of inconsistent status treatment. That is, it has tried to use history to demonstrate that Japanese decision-makers were aware of inconsistent status treatment accorded Japan by other great powers; that they were made aware of such treatment through the interference of other great powers with Japanese foreign policy objectives; that this interference created a frustrating situation, the perception of relative deprivation; and that after other means to correct the situation were tried and found wanting, aggression became the most plausible alternative.

Thus Japanese foreign policy behavior in the 1905-1941 period is analytically described as displaying varying levels of aggression. This behavior is attributed primarily to the policies pursued by the other great powers toward Japan. Aggression then is said to be a secondary condition. The policy implications of this assertion are highly significant. For instance, if one accepts the Freudian notion of instinctive aggressiveness contained in orthodox power theory then one justifies corrective policy inaction! That is, if one accepts the notion that aggression is internally generated then the level of aggression cannot be altered regardless of how conditions are improved or what corrective measures are taken. It is inevitable.

On the other hand, if one looks to external causation and if long-range trends or patterns leading to the outbreak of war can be identified then perhaps some kind of international monitoring body could be established. This body would be charged with providing policy-makers with information which would allow nations to alter their behavior patterns to bring about non-war outcomes.

To probe the possible psychological effects of inconsistent status treatment - a virtually untouched subject area, the study suggests looking to social-psychology literature. Galtung suggests that "... a theory

of aggression should combine the idea of frustration with the idea of perceiving aggression as a possible way out of the frustration situation." ²⁴² This study has been concerned with the concepts of frustration and relative deprivation, interference and aggression. Hence the study does not suggest strict reliance on the frustration-aggression hypothesis of the Dollard school, to probe the psychological effects of status inconsistency. However, it does not posit an automatic frustration-aggression sequence - that is - that frustration always breeds aggression.

In his theory of aggression Galtung also states that aggression is unlikely to occur unless the actor has had some past experience with aggression. This suggests a link between Galtung's theory and social learning theory. Albert Bandura, in his 'Social Learning Theory of Aggression' makes much the same observation about 'past experience'. Bandura states that:

Frustration is most likely to provoke aggression in people who have learned to respond to aversive experiences with aggressive attitudes and actions. ²⁴³

Bandura too deals with the concept of frustration but in a much different manner than the frustration-aggression school. He contends that the concept is so widely used in the

242. J. Galtung, Structural Theory of Aggression, p. 96.


243. A. Bandura, "A Social Learning Theory of Aggression", in J. F. Knutson, The Control of Aggression, p. 211 (the level of analysis problem will be addressed at the end of the chapter).

literature that it "subsumes such a diverse set of conditions ..." it is difficult to assign it a specific meaning. Social learning theory (Bandura: 1973) does however posit that:

... the diverse events subsumed under the omnibus term 'frustration' do have one feature in common: they are all aversive in varying degrees. In social learning theory it is not that frustration creates aggression, but that aversive experiences produce emotional arousal, that can elicit a variety of behaviors ... ²⁴⁴

Frustration is said to be one of the 'emotional arousals' produced by aversive experiences and aggression is a likely behavioral response to this particular emotional arousal.²⁴⁵ Other possible responses to aversive experiences may also be to seek help, to display achievement behavior or to withdraw as the model illustrates.

SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY



244. Ibid, p. 213

245. Ibid, p. 223.

The question of course is why some actors behave in one way and not others, i.e., aggress rather than withdraw. The common factor which emerges in both status inconsistency and social learning theory is social position and its consequences.²⁴⁶ Bandura maintains (like Galtung) that aggression is most probable "not in those who have lost hope, but in the more successful members ..." of a social system whose goal directed behavior has been thwarted.

Moreover, he states that:

People not only judge their present gains in relation to those secured in the past; they also compare their lot in life with the benefits accruing to others. Unfavorable discrepancies between observed and experienced outcomes tend to create discontent.²⁴⁷

One might then define a frustration situation as:

... one in which the actor is by some objective standards thwarted by some social or physical barrier in attempts to attain and continue the enjoyment of a value. The actor can be said to be frustrated only when he is aware of the interference or thwarting. This awareness then is equivalent to relative deprivation.²⁴⁸

When other means have been tried to correct the situation and have failed then aggression becomes a likely response,

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246. recall Galtung's 'self-righteousness', the tendency to compare and the axiomatic structure presented in this paper.
247. Ibid, p. 226. 'Discontent' is said to be analogous to frustration.
248. T. R. Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," in The American Political Science Review, LXII (Dec., 1968) p. 1107.

if the actor has some past experience with aggression. Thus, as Bandura points out:

What appears irrational and pathological to onlookers, and to the targets of aggression, ... (is) ... often a method for getting what ... (the thwarted actor) ... wants, when other options have failed or remain unavailable.²⁴⁹

Furthermore, Bandura also suggests that in cases where "thwarting provokes aggression," it may be attributable to "implied personal insult," as well as to the blocking goal directed behavior. Thus, he says, "defensive forms of aggression are often reinforced by their capacity to terminate humiliating ... treatment."²⁵⁰

While such a cursory review hardly does justice to Professor Bandura's work it is interesting to note the similar assumptions contained in his work and in the literature on status inconsistency. However the most obvious response from an international relations theorist would be that there is a level of analysis problem here; that one cannot simply apply a theory dealing with aggression at a personal or group level to the national level. This criticism of course is quite correct. A nation is not an individual and one cannot freely move from one level of analysis to another. However, what does emerge and what is

249. Bandura, p. 205.

250. Ibid, p. 232.

striking here is the similarity between Bandura's explanation of certain behavioral responses at the personal level and Japanese foreign policy behavior as presented in this study. (i.e., the assumptions about social position, the tendency to compare, upward mobility, thwarting, and possible aggressive response).

Returning briefly to Bandura's model and a consideration of Japan's foreign policy behavior, certain responses may be eliminated making aggression more probable. For instance, in the Japanese case 'withdrawal and resignation' may be eliminated in accordance with the axiomatic structure presented and the Choucri, North formulation. Furthermore the likelihood of withdrawal could perhaps be gauged by a measure of the intensity of commitment to the particular goal(s). The intensity of commitment might be measured in terms of government expenditure, time spent in pursuit of, military expenditure, troop concentration and lives lost and so on. The greater the intensity to commitment then, the less likely the tendency to withdraw and if other channels are blocked, the greater the likelihood of aggression as a means. Other possible responses are said to be to seek help and constructive problem solving. How does a nation do this. If a nation encounters interference with high priority policy objectives it may seek to correct the situation through alliances, agreements, bilateral or

multilateral negotiations. However if alliances, negotiations etc. prove either unresponsive or even counterproductive (as in Japan's case) then aggression as a means to achieve legitimate aims may become even more likely.

The kind of emotional arousal of course would depend on the nature of the aversive experience. The reaction in part would depend on the nation's capabilities and the success or failure of means to correct the situation produced by the aversive experience. It is unlikely, for instance, that all acts of interference will produce the same effect. Hence some differential scoring or weighting measures would have to be assigned to different kinds of interferences. For instance, one might consider diplomatic and economic sanctions. Galtung defines sanctions as "actions initiated by one or more international actors (senders) against one or more others (receivers) with either or both of two purposes: (1) to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or (2) to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important."²⁵¹ According to Galtung sanctions may be either negative - punishment for deviance or positive - rewards for compliance. Negative sanctions may be considered:

251. J. Galtung, "Economic Sanctions and Statecraft"
R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Politics and The International System, p. 336.

I) DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS

- 1) notes of protest from member states
- 2) protests of regional or world organizations
- 3) non-recognition
- 4) abrogation of treaties
- 5) refusal of direct contact between political leaders
- 6) rejection of proposals for division of international responsibility
- 7) rupture of diplomatic relations

II) ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

- 1) abrogation of commercial treaties
- 2) hitting imports to receiving nation (partial and/or full boycott)
- 3) hitting exports from receiving nation (export boycott)
- 4) reducing competitiveness of exports from receiving nation, (e.g., raising of tariff, import duties)

Interference may also take the form of rendering assistance to the receivers' enemy - in this case assistance to China thus strengthening the resistance; fleet concentration - as warning to receiver nation; refusal of equality - naval limitations for example; intervention in bilateral treaty negotiations including denial of treaty provisions in part or full; and the imposition and pursuit of policies inimical to the objectives of the receiver nation (e.g., the Open Door).

Interference is a social variable referring to interference with an actor's goal directed behavior and could be operationalized by sealing or scoring various acts of interference by other actors in the system. For instance: notes of protest (1); reducing competitiveness of exports from receiving nation (2); assistance to receiver's enemy (3); interference in bilateral negotiations (4); non-recognition (5); hitting imports to or exports from receiving nation (6); abrogation of treaties, commercial or otherwise (7); fleet and/or military concentration (8); refusal of diplomatic mission, rupture of diplomatic relations (9). The scores, ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 9 would indicate the increasing intensity of the various acts of interference.

The point that this paper makes is that, in the study of international relations, it may be a serious error to arbitrarily dismiss certain concepts and theoretical formulations simply because they pertain to a different level of analysis. There is an obvious urgency in the search for the causes of war but the study of such a phenomenon must be a thorough and eclectic one, not one where the researcher 'looks where there is the most light.'

In researching this study social-psychological factors such as frustration and interference emerged as

valuable explanatory factors. The way decision-makers perceive the intent of actions of other states has emerged as highly significant. For the sake of policy relevance it would be useful to devote more time to a consideration of the psychological effects of certain policies and conditions on the decision-makers of nations, and through them and the dissemination of information, on their populations. When policy-makers understand the effects of their policies on others and the conditions those policies create then they will be in a better position both to formulate policy and to alter policy outcomes.

Status, more specifically status inconsistency, has emerged as an important factor in this study. As pointed out earlier one of the problems discussed is a lack of indicators for the various dimensions. Single indicators necessarily lead to the simplistic T vs. U Galtungian dichotomy. A cultural variable would also appear essential in any listing of status dimensions. If a reliable cultural indicator(s) can be developed an assessment of the psychological effects of inconsistent status treatment would be greatly facilitated. Obviously if policy-makers are to understand the psychological effect of their policies some kind of weighting procedure is needed to assess the relative importance to a nation of particular dimensions.

While the literature on status inconsistency has been thought provoking a great deal of research still must be carried out. In conducting such research this paper calls attention to the complementary relationship between diplomatic history and social science.

If this study has in any way cast some light on the benefits of fusing the two fields and if it provokes further discussion of the psychological effects of the particular kind of status inconsistency explored - it, in the author's estimation - is considered a success.


APPENDIX AELITE TYPOLOGY1905 - 1941

The traditional school of historical thought paints a picture of Japanese policy-making during this period as government by assassination and intrigue; decisions are made often by unruly, fanatical army officers uncontrolled by civilian leadership. The Japanese policy-making process often is seen as an almost illegal process with various elites unable to agree on the direction or substance of policy. This study, on the contrary contends that there was a consistent consensus among the various elite on the desired 'ends' or objectives, although there frequently existed strong disagreement on the best 'means' to achieve these ends. The policy-making process is viewed here as a much more orderly process than is presented by the traditional school. Certainly the existence of various competing elites attempting to influence the policy-making process is not peculiar to Japan in this period!

Because of this divergence of views of the policy-making process it appeared essential to include an elite typology with which can be shown what groups influence policy-making in what way and at what points in the period investigated. Very broadly the study defines as elites the following groups.

- (1) Civilian, comprised of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, including the service ministers and until the end of World War One, the genro;
- (2) The Army, including the Army General Staff and the field armies;
- (3) The Navy.

Primarily this appendix is concerned with the triangular relationship between the civilian leadership, the Army and the Navy. Although the respective groups should not be assumed to be 'closed' or mutually exclusive. That is, rather than three united fronts, often there is cabinet disagreement with, for instance the Foreign Ministry siding with the Army General Staff. The relationship explored is diagrammatically illustrated as follows:



This appendix relies almost exclusively on J. B. Crowley's article "Military Foreign Policies" in Morley (ed) Dilemmas of Growth in Pre-War Japan, p. 1 - 118. It does so without hesitation because the Crowley article is found to be the best scholarly work on this particular question found during the course of researching this study. It is also one of the most objective accounts read, and one which substantiates the notion of consensus in policy-making and which refutes the notion of a nation controlled by fanatical army officers of the Kwantung Army.

Pre 1905

During Japan's quest for empire in the final decade of the nineteenth century, military planning and policies were effectively subordinated to political leadership. Two examples here will suffice to demonstrate the propensity of the Meiji oligarchy to coordinate military activities. When Japan went to war with China in 1894, both the geographical extent and the timing of military operations were determined, not by the military, but by the Genro. Political leadership was provided by genro Ito who was a participant in the Imperial Headquarters. Genro Yamagata secured government supervision of the conduct of the war through a written agreement with the army.

Government supervision of military operations was reinforced during the 1905 Russo-Japanese war. Meetings of the Imperial Headquarters were attended by Ito, Yamagata, Prime Minister Katsura and Foreign Minister Komura, who determined both national and strategic objectives. In this period then civilian leadership, i.e., the cabinet and the genro were the dominant forces in the policy making period.

1905 - 1914

After the Portsmouth settlement of the Russo-Japanese war the primary focus of both the Army and the Navy was on the defense of the Japanese empire, especially its new rights in Manchuria. At this point each service developed its own concept of national defense and this divergence remained until 1940. Although both services were concerned with the same objectives - security and the nations ability to expand - each chose differing means to secure these aims. The army regarded Russia as the nation's main enemy (fearing a war of revenge) while the Navy viewed the United States as constituting the greatest threat to the nation. Furthermore, the army charged with its recent success was seeking complete administrative control of South Manchuria. The genro however moved to check the army's advances. In 1906 genro Ito with Prime Minister Saionji called a conference to tackle the Manchurian problem.

The conference was attended by the genro Ito, Yamagata, Oyama, Matsukata, Masayoshi and Inoue, the General Staff Chiefs and the most important cabinet ministers. The attendants resolved to change the resident military governor-general in South Manchuria to a governor-general and create a consulate-general for the foreign-ministry. The consulate-general was given a rank equal to that of the highest ranking army officer in South Manchuria.

The genro had thus effectively curbed the power of the army and reinforced its own dominant position. However in army circles there remained the feeling that the service should be independent of the cabinet and directly responsible to the Emperor. Such a view was not without some legal foundation. By 1908, national defense plans and logistical estimates no longer had to pass through the army minister and as Crowley points out:

These changes precluded effective cabinet supervision of the internal administration of the services and broadened the implications of the independence of the supreme command. In many respects they marked the legal attainment of administrative autonomy.¹

After the 1905 war the Diet refused to approve any major increases in military expenditures and in 1911 the cabinet of Prince Saionji embarked on a program of fiscal retrenchment. To force the cabinet's hand, Army Minister Uehara, former chief of Army General Staff, resigned in protest. The army refused to designate a new minister and the Saionji cabinet fell. The genro then appointed a new (Katsura) cabinet, but the actions of the army did call into question the Prime Minister's leadership role in the policy-making process.

1. Crowley, p. 27.

The civilian cabinet-genro position of dominance was reinforced in 1913 however with the formation of the Yamamoto cabinet. The new cabinet marked a:

... more conciliatory relationship between the cabinet and the Diet (and) marked the first public commitment of the cabinet to the notion of a constitutional form of government which placed great importance on public opinion and political parties. (It was) in effect a rebuke to the tactics and outlook of Army Minister Uehara.²

1914 - 1921: The Passing of the Genro

The expansionary policies of Japan often are attributed (in the traditionalist school) to the military but Japanese policy-making during World War One provides an illustration that expansion, and Asian leadership was an objective common to all groups. The Twenty-One Demands of 1915, for example, were the product of civilian leadership. Cognizant of the post 1905 feud between the foreign ministry and the army over control of Japan's China policy, Prime Minister Okuma and Foreign Minister Kato tried, through the Twenty-One Demands to place the China question under cabinet control. Furthermore it was Okuma and Kato who defined the new set of political and military objectives, i.e., acquisition of German islands in the Pacific, political and economic hegemony over China. The Twenty-One Demands and the resultant treaties met with the approval of the army, navy, the cabinet, the Diet and the major industrial concerns. The Genro, on the other hand were opposed. However it opposed the tactics employed not the objectives sought, fearing the action would provoke a negative Anglo-American response detrimental to Japan's objectives. Genro opposition was ignored by Okuma and the Twenty-One Demands, "*marked the assertion of cabinet autonomy in the formulation of national policy.*"³ The adverse domestic (genro) reaction to the Demands prompted Okuma to form the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations - which in effect assumed the role played by the genro in previous years.

The Okuma administration also reduced the influence of the Diet and the political parties by funnelling the Diet vs. military expenditure feud into a new bureaucratic organ - the Council on National Defense. This body was comprised of the Prime Minister, foreign, army, navy and finance ministers, the chiefs of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff and sanctioned an increase in the size of the Japanese force in Korea.

2. Ibid, p. 29

3. Crowley, p. 34.

In October 1916, Okuma resigned and the genro appointed General Terauchi as Prime Minister. The new Terauchi cabinet continued the policy of consolidating Japan's position as a result of the 1915 treaties.

The nature of the Siberian Intervention debate demonstrates well the idea that while there existed, among the various elites, different views on means, there was a common objective. During this debate, the cabinet and the Army General Staff were united in arguing for a policy independent of the other powers which would secure for Japan immediate advantages (economic, political, military) in Manchuria and the Maritime Provinces. The Advisory Council on Foreign Relations, on the other hand under the sway of Hara Takashi (Prime Minister in September 1918) and Army Minister Makino Nobuaki, favored co-operation with the powers in Siberia as the best means to secure advantages for Japan. The latter view prevailed and Japan participated in a joint intervention with the Western Powers. What is also significant here is that:

The nature of this policy formulation confirmed that the genro were no longer the ultimate determinant of major policies. It revealed too that the cabinet and General Staffs were partial to an independent foreign policy. In addition it demonstrated that in terms of 'National Defense' policy the view of the Army General Staff had become subordinate to the leadership of the army minister, even in strategic matters. (For example) ... the government did not create an Imperial Headquarters during the Siberian intervention. Instead the Cabinet assigned responsibility for deciding the limits of military operations. A written agreement between the Army Minister and the Chief of the General Staff delineated their respective spheres of authority. The determination of objectives at the onset of operations was to be left to the army minister; the conduct of operations fell to the General Staff.⁴

The views expressed in cabinet by the army minister therefore prevailed over those of the chief of the General Staff at this time.

In September of 1918 Japan's first 'party' government was organized by Hara Takashi. However, "despite Hara's role in the Siberian intervention and his desire for friendly relations with the United States (means) his government was strongly committed to the preservation of Japan's new position in East Asia (end)."⁵

4. Ibid, p. 36.

5. Ibid, p. 36.

1922 - 1931

Although the powers at the Washington Conference did not recognize the army's claim that Japanese control over Manchuria was essential for the nations security, it did allow Japan naval superiority in her home waters. Out of the Washington treaties grew a feeling that co-operation with the Western powers rather than unilateral action was a better *means* of securing Japanese leadership in East Asia. In turn this:

... strengthened the position of the Prime Minister within the cabinet, and of the army and navy ministers within the services. (It) established the priority of foreign affairs over national defence in the ultimate determination of national policy and this in turn *signified the hegemony of civil leadership in foreign policy matters* and contributed to the growth of parliamentary government during the 1920s.⁶

The authority of the cabinet was further increased by the announcement of Prime Minister Kato Tomosaburo in 1922 that military expenditures would be cut back because national defense was 'not determined by military arms alone.' Rather the new cabinet stressed agricultural, financial, industrial capabilities as well as relations with other nations. Cabinet strength was also demonstrated in 1924 when Army Minister Ugaki successfully 'deactivated' four army divisions over the strong opposition of the Army General Staff.

Japanese diplomacy in the 1920s is largely identified with two men, Tanaka Giichi and Shidehara Kijino, who conducted the foreign policies of their two political parties, the Seiyukai and the Minseito respectively. Co-operation is the label usually used to characterize Shidehara while 'positive policy' normally is attached to Tanaka. The appropriateness of the labels is an active debate, but what is significant here is the fact that both men were concerned with the preservation of Japanese rights in China. One distinction that can be made however is that Shidehara favored a single China policy, while Tanaka tended to separate Manchuria and Mongolia from the rest of China.

Japan's China policy was a sensitive public issue during the 1920s, as Crowley points out:

Virtually every articulate segment of Japanese society, the bureaucracies, Zaibatsu; farm and labor organizations, believed that Japanese rights on the continent were legitimate.⁷

6. Ibid, p. 42.

7. Ibid, p. 44.

Whether the Japanese people would lean toward co-operation with the powers or toward unilateral action depended primarily on the success of one or the other policy in securing Japan's dominant position in East Asia. Faced with growing Chinese nationalism and Soviet troop buildups along the Manchurian-Mongolian border Prime Minister Tanaka in 1927 convened the Eastern Conference which decided on the use of force if it proved necessary to protect Japanese rights in Manchuria. The Conference was attended by:

... officials of the Foreign, Finance, Army and Navy Ministers and representatives of the General Staff and the Kwantung Army ... the policy reflected a *consensus* among military and civilian officials including those of the foreign ministry. The Eastern Conference also reflected a *consensus* that Manchuria was separate from China and that Japan needed two policies.⁸

Thus:

... by 1930 strong dissatisfaction within the Foreign Ministry and the Army with the basic tenets of Shidehara diplomacy flourished within the Foreign Ministry and the Army and it was becoming apparent that adherence to the leadership of the Prime Minister (Hamaguchi) and the Foreign Minister was being corroded by a belief that Shidehara diplomacy was not adequate to the maintenance of Japan's position in Manchuria.⁹

The dispute at the end of the 1920s then was one over means not ends.

The Hamaguchi-Shidehara cabinet suffered a further setback in the aftermath of the 1930 London Naval Conference primarily because of three reactions within the navy. In the first instance, all of the senior officers who had supported or at least deferred to the prime ministers wishes were either retired or resigned. Furthermore, the Navy General Staff immediately drew up a supplemental budget to allow for naval construction up to the limits set by the London Treaty, which Hamaguchi accepted. Finally, the Supreme War Council in an official reply to the Throne on the London Treaty argued that "regardless of diplomatic considerations, the government should not deviate from the minimum national defense needs established by the Navy General Staff." This opinion went unchallenged by Hamaguchi. The cumulative result of the naval reactions was to abridge -

8. Ibid, p. 45.

9. Ibid, p. 46.

... the power of the Prime Minister to determine Japan's naval armament policy. This development was buttressed by a *popular* enthusiasm for the sanctity of the Supreme Command and by a *popular* conviction that Hamaguchi had compromised the security of the nation.¹⁰

By 1931, the consistent attacks by the Seiyukai on the Hamaguchi-Shidehara cabinet and its unsuccessfulness in attaining Japanese objectives, the Soviet threat and Chinese Nationalism had greatly intensified both public and political sentiment. This in turn "produced a *consensus* in Central Headquarters that strong policy toward the continent was essential." In August two Army Colonels drafted the 'Basic Principles for a Settlement of the Manchurian problem' aimed at undermining the Shidehara policy. The 'Basic Principles' proposed a joint Army-Foreign Ministry policy and encouraged public opposition to current cabinet policies.

Implicit in this was the assumption that Shidehara diplomacy was inadequate to the existing situation and that the Army should actively seek to rectify this condition. This lack of commitment to the legally constituted civilian leadership was not confined to the army ministry. Also included were members of the General Staff and nationalistic societies.¹¹

1931 - 1941

In the 1931-1933 period:

... party cabinets and the leadership of the Prime Minister in determining national policy were replaced by the 'national unity cabinet' of Admiral Saito Makoto and the Five Ministers Conference as the policy-making unit.¹²

Without going into detail on the Manchurian Incident, it should be pointed out that the Kwantung Army extended hostilities despite a cabinet order to localize the incident and a similar order from Chief of General Staff General Kanaya. The General Staff however was not united. Some General Staff members, including Vice-Chief General Ninomiya Harushige, General Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, Chief of the Operations Division, favored the army's action and gave conflicting advice.¹³

10. Ibid, p. 50.

11. Ibid, p. 53.

12. Ibid, p. 55.

13. Ogata, p. 41.

While border skirmishes and initial hostilities may be accidental occurrences, war and/or conquest and consolidation requires official planning, popular support and so on. The Kwantung Army had the popular support but of even greater significance is the fact that the *cabinet* (in December 1931) *sanctioned the conquest of Chinchow*. Furthermore the cabinet of Prime Minister Inukai Tsoyoshi in March, 1932 adopted a policy outline prepared by the army minister and the Supreme War Council to settle the Manchurian problem.

It should not be assumed however that the army was dominating the policy-making process at this time. The notion of Japan's 'special mission' in East Asia was very prevalent in the foreign ministry and also in naval circles. In May, 1933 the Navy General Staff announced that the security of East Asia was dependent upon Japan's actual power and called for an increased naval budget.

Captivated by the image of a stewardship over Asian affairs, many professional diplomats became steady allies of the Navy Ministry in the vital struggle of cabinet politics and policies. Since each service held different concepts of national defence, this support was crucial in preventing the army's viewpoint from becoming dominant.¹⁴

For the Navy, the United States remained the primary enemy, for the Army it was the Soviet Union. Both services agreed on the ultimate objective - the leadership of East Asia but they differed on the means to attain this end. For instance the Army between 1934-1937 launched a number of 'independence movements' in North China. The Navy and Foreign Ministry on the other hand felt that Japanese leadership could be better established by relying on the power of the Japanese fleet.

Reasoning that the Nanking government could resist Japanese leadership only if it received financial and political support from the Western powers they hoped to cajole Britain and the United States to accept a Japanese Monroe doctrine.¹⁵

In mid-1934 the cabinet of Prime Minister Okada Keisuke created the 'Cabinet Deliberative Council.' Within this body were represented the major political parties, the Zaibatsu, and the House of Peers and was headed by Okada and Finance Minister Takahash Korekiyo. This council then established the Cabinet Research Bureau and -

14. Crowley, p. 59.

15. Crowley, p. 61

... within the framework of this group representatives of the Army and other ministries set out to devise legislative recommendations and common policies for the cabinet. Here began the effective liaison among military, economic, political and bureaucratic personnel which produced in 1935 a new administrative arrangement to govern Manchukuo ... The Cabinet Research Bureau was one way the military indirectly affected foreign policy.¹⁶

When the China War broke out in 1937 the Army General Staff argued that the war be terminated to allow the army to concentrate on the Soviet Union. However Prime Minister Konoye's 'New Order' as an objective of the war was adopted over the objections of the Army General Staff. Konoye was supported by the Navy General Staff which felt the benefits of southward expansion (to the South Seas) would greatly improve the relative strength of the Imperial fleet.

With the Army and Navy General Staffs still unable to develop a single, co-ordinated policy for the conduct of the war, the Konoye cabinet was free to determine both strategy and diplomacy. However, as Crowley points out:

... one should not equate the outlook of the General Staff with that of the Field Army or even the Army Ministry. Many officers in these groups favored cabinet policy... Too many groups in military, bureaucratic, industrial and political circles were actively involved in the cause of the 'New Order.' Neutralized by the Navy General Staff in the Imperial Headquarters and by the Army Ministry in the Liaison Conferences, the leaders of the Army General Staff were unable to blunt the momentum behind the China policy of the Konoye government... As long as the Imperial Headquarters could not devise one strategic policy *the cabinet remained the primary policy-making unit.*¹⁷

However, early German victories in the blitzkrieg of 1940 opened new opportunities for expansion in the South Pacific for Japan.

In this context, the Army Minister and the Army General Staff ventured that Japan's security would be greatly enhanced by control of the resources of Southeast Asia, a view that was promptly seconded by the Navy General Staff. By July 1940, both services had finally agreed on one strategic policy centering on Southeast Asia.¹⁸

16. Ibid, p. 63.

17. Ibid, p. 80.

18. Ibid, p. 83.

By 1941, as the main body of this study has shown, the Liaison Conference had become the main policy-making body and it is felt the notion of consensus viz the decision for war has earlier been demonstrated.

APPENDIX B

The Twenty-One Demands

The list of original demands and instructions given by Baron Kato Takaaki to Hioki Eki, minister in Peking:

Ist Instructions given by Baron Kato to Mr. Hioki (Handed in Tokyo, Dec 3 1914)

In order to provide for the readjustment of affairs consequent on the Japan-German war and for the purpose of ensuring a lasting peace in the Far East by strengthening the position of the Empire, the Imperial Government have resolved to approach the Chinese Government with a view to conclude treaties and agreements mainly along the lines laid down in the first four Groups of the appended proposals. Of these, the first Group relates to the settlement of the Shantung question, while the second Group has for its chief aim the defining of Japan's position in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, that is to say, securing at this time from the Chinese Government full recognition of Japan's natural position in these regions, absence of which has hitherto been the cause for various questions tending to estrange the feelings of the two peoples towards each other. The object of the third Group is to safeguard the best interests of the Han-yeh-Ping Company, with which Japanese capitalists are closely identified. It will thus be seen that there is nothing especially new in our proposals embodied in the foregoing three Groups, while as regards the fourth Group, it is only intended to emphasise the principle of China's territorial integrity, which has so often been declared by the Imperial Government.

Believing it absolutely essential, for strengthening Japan's position in Eastern Asia as well as for preservation of the general interests of that region, to secure China's adherence to the foregoing proposals, the Imperial Government are determined to attain this end by all means within their power. You are, therefore, requested to use your best endeavour in the conduct of the negotiations, which are hereby placed in your hands.

As regards the proposals contained in the fifth Group, they are presented as the wishes of the Imperial Government. The matters which are dealt with under this category are entirely different in character from those which are included in the first four Groups. An adjustment, at this time, of these matters, some of which have been pending between the two countries, being nevertheless highly desirable for the advancement of the friendly relations between Japan and China as well as for safeguarding their common interests, you are also requested to exercise your best efforts to have our wishes carried out.

It is very likely that in the course of these negotiations the Chinese Government (will) desire to find out the attitude of the Imperial Government on the question of the disposition of the leased territory of Kiaochou Bay. If the Chinese Government will accept our proposals as above-stated, the Imperial Government may, with due regard to the principle of China's territorial integrity and in the interest of the friendship of the two countries, well consider the question with a view to restoring the said territory to China, in the event of Japan's being given a free hand in the disposition thereof as the result of the coming peace conference between Japan and Germany. As, however, it will be absolutely necessary, in restoring the said territory to China, to lay certain conditions such as the opening of the territory for foreign trade, establishment of a Japanese settlement, etc., you will ask for further instructions when you propose to the Chinese Government the willingness of the Imperial Government to consider the question.

GROUP I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous to maintain the general peace in the Far East and to strengthen the relations of amity and good neighbourhood existing between the two countries, agree to the following articles:

ART. I. The Chinese Government engage to give full assent to all matters that the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses via-a-via China in relation to the Province of Shantung.

ART. II. The Chinese Government engage that, within the Province of Shantung or along its coast, no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any other Power, under any pretext whatever.

ART. III. The Chinese Government agree to Japan's building a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkow with the Kiaochou-Tsinanfu Railway.

ART. IV. The Chinese Government engage to open of their own accord, as soon as possible, certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung for the residence and commerce of foreigners. The places to be so opened shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.

GROUP II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that the Chinese Government has always recognised the predominant position of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

ART. I. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the terms of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the term respecting the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to a further period of 99 years respectively.

ART. II. The Japanese subjects shall be permitted in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to lease or own land required either for erecting buildings for various commercial and industrial uses or for farming.

ART. III. The Japanese subjects shall have liberty to enter, reside and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and to carry on business of various kinds - commercial, industrial and otherwise.

ART. IV. The Chinese Government grant to the Japanese subjects the right of mining in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards the mines to be worked, they shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.

ART. V. The Chinese Government agree that the consent of the Japanese Government shall be obtained in advance, (1) whenever it is proposed to grant to other nationals the right of constructing a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and (2) whenever a loan is to be made with any other Power, under security of the taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

ART. VI. The Chinese Government engage that whenever the Chinese Government need the service of political, financial or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or in Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan shall first be consulted.

ART. VII. The Chinese Government agree that the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway shall be handed over to Japan for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this Treaty.

GROUP III

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, having regard to the close relations existing between Japanese capitalists and the Han-Yeh-Ping Company and desiring to promote the common interests of the two nations, agree to the following articles:

ART. I. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and that, without the consent of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government shall not dispose or permit the Company to dispose of any right or property of the Company.

ART. II. The Chinese Government engage that, as a necessary measure for protection of the invested interests of Japanese capitalists, no mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by anyone other than the said Company; and further that whenever it is proposed to take any other measure which may likely affect the interests of the said Company, directly or indirectly, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.

GROUP IV

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China, agree to the following article:

The Chinese Government engage not to cede or lease to any other Power any harbour or bay or any island along the coast of China.

GROUP V

1. The Chinese Central Government to engage influential Japanese as political, financial and military advisers;

2. The Chinese Government to grant the Japanese hospitals, temples and schools and in the interior of China the right to own land;

3. In the face of many police disputes which have hitherto arisen between Japan and China causing no little misunderstanding localities (in China), where such arrangements are necessary, to be placed under joint Japanese and Chinese administration, or Japanese to be employed in police offices in such localities, so as to help at the same time the improvement of the Chinese Police Service;

4. China to obtain from Japan supply of a certain quantity of arms, or to establish an arsenal in China under joint Japanese and Chinese management and to be supplied with experts and materials from Japan;

5. In order to help the development of the Nanchang-Kiukiang Railway with which Japanese capitalists are so closely identified, and with due regard to the negotiations which have for years been pending between Japan and China in relation to the railway question in South China, China to agree to give Japan the right of constructing a railway to connect Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, and also the railways between Nanchang and Hangchou and between Nanchang and Chaochou;

6. In view of the relations between the Province of Fukien and Formosa and of the agreement respecting the non-alienation of that province, Japan to be consulted first whenever foreign capital is needed in connection with the railways, mines and harbour works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien;

7. China to grant to Japanese subjects the right of preaching in China.

APPENDIX C

Table 1

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCEIN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Growth Rate of Real Net Domestic Product Per Decade (Per Cent)

1880 - 1890	29.5
1890 - 1900	67.6
1900 - 1910	42.7
1910 - 1920	61.5
1920 - 1930	33.4
1930 - 1940	72.1

Note: Based on midpoint of five-year averages.

Source: Derived from Yujiro Hayami and Saburo Yamada, "Agricultural Productivity at the Beginning of Industrialization" in Kazushi Ohdawa, Bruce F. Johnston and Hiromitsu Kaneda, eds., *Agriculture and Economic Growth: Japan's Experience* (Princeton and Tokyo, 1970), Appendix C, p. 135. Cited in *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan*, edited by James W. Morley (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1971).

CONSOLIDATED CENTRAL PLUS LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES

(million yen)

YEAR	Government Expenditures ^a			Government Revenues		Government Surplus or Deficit ^e	Central Government Surplus
	Total (1)	Military ^b (2)	Investment ^c (3)	Total (4)	Savings ^d (5)		
1910	680	186	167	697	184	17	78
1911	828	206	214	803	189	- 25	17
1912	696	201	185	803	292	107	138
1913	682	192	186	813	317	131	149
1914	698	222	165	782	248	84	94
1915	657	240	143	768	254	111	97
1916	661	273	139	894	372	233	204
1917	897	391	207	1,118	428	221	190
1918	1,250	641	270	1,358	377	108	65
1919	1,817	981	432	1,864	479	47	31
1920	2,350	940	685	1,902	237	- 448	- 383
1921	2,404	842	681	2,163	440	- 241	- 160
1922	2,487	693	756	2,489	758	2	36
1923	2,331	530	747	2,256	672	- 75	- 14
1924	2,425	487	778	2,465	818	40	47
1925	2,351	448	753	2,535	937	184	202
1926	2,503	437	872	2,445	814	- 58	78
1927	2,837	494	878	2,456	497	- 381	- 93
1928	3,148	519	865	2,574	291	- 574	- 173
1929	2,912	497	871	2,518	477	- 394	- 156
1930	2,438	444	608	2,121	291	- 317	256
1931	2,690	462	545	2,045	- 100	- 645	50
1932	3,076	705	631	2,077	- 368	- 999	- 473
1933	3,384	886	679	2,209	- 496	- 1,175	- 470
1934	3,309	953	632	2,543	- 134	- 766	- 547
1935	3,550	1,043	647	2,715	- 188	- 835	- 561
1936	3,684	1,089	687	2,978	- 19	- 706	- 385
1937	5,788	3,299	755	4,286	- 747	- 1,502	- 2,047
1938	8,007	5,984	901	4,107	- 2,999	- 3,900	- 3,799
1939	8,778	6,495	1,167	4,785	- 2,826	- 3,993	- 3,992
1940	11,711	7,967	1,472	6,510	- 3,729	- 5,201	- 4,588

SOURCE: Koichi Emi and Yuichi Shionoya, *Government Expenditures*, Vol. 7, LTES. Data in Col. 7 for 1930-40 are based on general account revenues in Prime Minister's office, *Japan Statistical Yearbook 1950* (Tokyo, 1951).

^aExpenditures consist of purchases of goods and services plus current subsidies and Transfers to the private sector.

(continued)

Table 3

RATIOS OF MILITARY TO TOTAL EXPENDITURES AND OF GOVERNMENTEXPENDITURES TO NET DOMESTIC PRODUCT

(in percent)

YEAR	Military Expenditures to			Central to Net Domestic Product	Central plus Local to Net Domestic Product
	Central Government Expenditures	Central plus Local Government Expenditures	Net Domestic Product		
1910	43.5	27.4	5.8	13.2	21.0
1911	42.5	24.9	5.3	12.5	21.3
1912	49.9	28.9	4.6	9.1	15.8
1913	46.6	28.2	4.2	9.1	15.0
1914	50.9	31.8	5.4	10.5	16.8
1915	57.7	36.5	5.6	9.7	15.4
1916	65.2	41.3	5.1	7.8	12.4
1917	64.7	43.6	5.3	8.2	12.2
1918	73.0	51.3	6.1	8.4	12.0
1919	76.2	54.0	7.7	10.1	14.3
1920	60.5	40.0	7.1	11.7	17.8
1921	56.2	35.0	6.7	11.9	19.0
1922	48.4	27.9	5.4	11.2	19.4
1923	39.7	22.7	4.0	10.1	17.7
1924	33.9	20.1	3.4	10.0	16.9
1925	34.2	19.1	3.0	8.8	15.8
1926	31.6	17.5	3.0	9.6	17.3
1927	30.3	12.4	3.4	11.2	19.4
1928	29.4	16.5	3.6	12.1	21.6
1929	29.5	17.1	3.5	11.8	20.4

b Narrowly defined to exclude military pensions and interest on the government debt.

c Excludes all military investment; all military expenditures are regarded as current.

d Government revenues minus the sum of government current purchases of goods and services, subsidies and transfers.

e Government revenues minus expenditures (Col 4 - Col 1); by definition it also is government savings minus investment (Col 5 - Col 3).

Table 3
(continued)

YEAR	Central Government Expenditures	Central plus Local Government Expenditures	Net Domestic Product	Central to Net Domestic Product	Central plus Local to Net Domestic Product
1930	41.7	18.2	3.6	8.7	18.9
1931	34.9	17.2	4.1	11.6	21.9
1932	39.1	22.9	5.5	14.2	22.9
1933	46.0	26.2	6.1	13.3	21.5
1934	48.3	28.8	6.3	13.0	21.3
1935	50.7	29.4	6.3	12.5	20.7
1936	52.0	29.6	5.9	11.4	19.3
1937	77.3	57.0	15.4	19.9	26.9
1938	92.0	74.7	23.0	25.0	30.8
1939	88.3	74.0	19.3	21.9	26.1
1940	85.9	68.0	21.2	24.7	31.1

Sources: Table 2 and cited in Morley p. 214.

Table 4

JAPANESE BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL INDEBTEDNESSEXCLUSIVE OF SHORT-TERM CAPITAL ^a

(rough estimates in million yen)

	<u>1913</u>	<u>1919</u>	<u>1929</u>
Japanese Long-Term Liabilities	2,070	1,822	2,549
Borrowing from Abroad	1,970	1,722	2,304
Foreign Direct Investment in Japan	100	100	425
Japanese Long-Term Assets	529	1,850	1,676
Loans to Abroad	61	975	245
China	55	417	244 ^b
Allies	...	557	... ^b
Japanese Direct Investment	468	875	1,431
China	278	(600)	(750)
South Manchuria Railway	100	100	391
Net Long-Term Position	- 1,541	28	- 873
Foreign Exchange Reserves	376	2,045	1,343
Net Position Excluding Short-Term Balances	- 1,165	2,073	470

SOURCE: Derived from Harold G. Moulton, *Japan, An Economic and Financial Appraisal* (Washington, D.C., 1931), pp. 390-403; Bank of Japan, *Hundred-Year Statistics of Japanese Economy* (Tokyo, 1966).

^a Japan's investment in its empire are also excluded.

^b Excluded are defaulted loans of 271 million yen to the Chinese government and 240 million yen to Czarist Russia. The direct investment estimates are crude, particularly Japanese investment in China, which for 1919 and 1929 are no more than orders of magnitude. For China the distinction between loans and direct investment is somewhat arbitrary.

Table 5

SUMMARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE ^a

	(million yen)						
	1908 1913	1914 1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1920 1923
I. Balance on Current Account ^b	-1142.4	3035.0	-79.3	-246.2	-181.5	-447.9	-954.9
1. Trade Balance	-706.5	1197.5	-500.1	-442.0	-336.1	-617.7	-1895.9
2. Invisible Balance	-435.9	1837.5	420.8	195.8	154.6	169.8	941.0
II. Changes in Foreign Exchange ^c	167.7	1700.7	126.7	-74.7	-238.5	-171.1	-357.6
3. Gold Flows	-59.7	603.8	407.5	132.5	1.1	-0.1	541.0
4. Balances Held Abroad	227.4	1096.9	-280.8	-207.2	-239.6	-171.0	-898.6
III. Other Capital Flows ^d	-1310.1	1334.3	-206.0	-171.5	57.0	-276.8	-597.3
5. Long-Term	-524.6	1409.7	226.3	72.3	128.2	214.7	212.1
6. Short-Term	-785.5	-75.4	-432.3	-243.8	-71.2	-62.1	-809.4
IV. Errors and Omissions (I-II-III) ^e

Table 5 (continued)

	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1924 1929
I. Balance on Current Account ^b	-565.6	-202.1	-302.5	-141.1	-172.7	19.0	-1365.0
1. Trade Balance	-729.8	-357.0	-442.5	-289.0	-333.9	-168.3	-2320.5
2. Invisible Balance	164.2	154.9	140.0	147.9	161.2	187.3	955.5
II. Changes in Foreign Exchange ^c	-118.5	-90.0	-59.8	-80.0	-71.6	144.0	-276.7
3. Gold Flows	0	-22.0	-31.8	-36.0	0.4	0.5	-88.8
4. Balances Held Abroad	-118.5	-68.0	-28.0	-44.0	-72.0	143.5	-187.9
III. Other Capital Flows ^d	-447.1	-112.1	-242.7	-2.4	-44.6	-86.5	-1088.3
5. Long-Term	-238.0	-63.9	-36.9	+126.2	-53.4	52.8	-213.2
6. Short-Term	-209.1	-48.2	-205.8	-128.6	8.8	-139.3	-875.1
IV. Errors and Omissions ^e (I-II-III)	-58.7	-56.5	-38.5

Table 5 (continued)

	1930	1931	1930 1931	1932	1933	1934
I. Balance on Current Account ^b	-27.3	-57.5	-84.8	43.3	31.9	62.9
1. Trade Balance	-160.3	-141.1	-301.4	-58.8	-77.9	-129.3
2. Invisible Balance	133.0	83.6	216.6	102.1	109.8	192.2
II. Changes in Foreign Exchange ^c	-383.0	-403.0	-786.0	-3.0	-59.0	0
3. Gold Flows	-286.8	-388.2	-675.0	-112.1	-20.9	0
4. Balances Held Abroad	-96.2	-14.8	-111.0	-109.1	-38.1	0
III. Other Capital Flows ^d	319.7	328.7	720.4	127.8	152.5	-2.9
5. Long-Term	92.0	233.9	325.9	167.8	41.0	233.2
6. Short-Term	227.7	94.8	494.5	-40.0	111.5	-226.1
IV. Errors and Omissions ^e (I-II-III)	-36.0	16.8	-19.2	-174.1	-179.6	-65.8

Table 5 (continued)

	1935	1936	1937 ^f	1932 1937
I. Balance on Current Account ^b	310.1	-131.0	-653.0	-73.8
1. Trade Balance	131.8	-101.9	-635.0	-871.1
2. Invisible Balance	178.3	232.9	-18.0	797.3
II. Changes in Foreign Exchange ^c	36.0	46.0	-1220.1	-1220.1
3. Gold Flows	0.1	0	-866.9	-999.8
4. Balances Held Abroad	35.9	46.0	-353.2	-200.3
III. Other Capital Flows ^d	245.8	130.7	567.1	1221.0
5. Long-Term	454.6	226.6	567.1	1123.2
6. Short-Term	-208.8	-95.9	97.8
IV. Errors and Omissions ^e (I-II-III)	28.3	-45.7

SOURCE: E. B. Schumpeter, ed. *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo 1930-1940*, appendix table III; Ministry of Finance, *Zaisei kinyu tokei geppo*, no. 5 (May 1950).

^a Japan proper, Taiwan, Korea, South Sea mandated islands.

^b Minus indicates net inflow.

^c Minus indicates net decrease of reserves and outflow of gold.

^d Minus indicates net inflow of capital.

^e Where information not available, assumed to fully in (short-term) capital account.

^f 1937 capital and foreign exchange data are not fully comparable with previous years; "balances held abroad" might equally well be classified under short-term capital flows.

Table 6

JAPAN'S NAVAL POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER POWERSJanuary 1932

	<u>British Commonwealth</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>Japan</u>
Battleships	12	15	10
Battle-cruisers	3	-	-
Cruisers	52	19	27
Aircraft carriers	6	3	3
Seaplan carriers	2	-	1
Destroyers	150	251	110
Torpedo boats (small destroyers)	-	-	-
Submarines	52	81	67
Monitors, coast defence and old armoured ships	3	1	1
Minelayers	1	-	4
Sloops and escort vessels	34	-	-
Minesweepers	32	43	10
Gunboats, river gunboats and patrol vessels	17	20	14

* Cited in S. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, p. 575-576.

Table 7

January 1939

	<u>British Commonwealth</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>Japan</u>
Battleships	12	15	9
Battle-cruisers	3	-	-
Pocket battleships	-	-	-
Cruisers	62	32	39
Aircraft carriers	7	5	5
Seaplan carriers	2	-	3
Destroyers	159	209	84
Torpedo boats (small destroyers)	11	-	38
Submarines	54	87	58
Monitors, coast defence and old armoured ships	3	-	1
Minelayers	1	8	10
Sloops and escort vessles	38	-	-
Gunboats, river gunboats and patrol vessles	27	20	10
Minesweepers	38	-	12
Submarine chasers	-	24	5

* Ibid, p. 577-578.

Table 8

January 1939Ships Building (Principal categories only)

	<u>British Commonwealth</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>Japan</u>
Battleships	5	6	3
Battle-cruisers	-	-	-
Aircraft carriers	6	1	1
Seaplane carriers	-	-	2
Cruisers	17	9	2
Destroyers and torpedo boats	28	42	2
Submarines	15	19	2

* Ibid, p. 579.

Table 9

NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAMMES AS FINALLY IMPLEMENTED 1919-1939

<u>Programme or Authorisation Year</u>	<u>British Commonwealth</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>Japan</u>
1919		12 destroyers	2 cruisers 4 destroyers 2 submarines
1920			1 battleship 1 cruiser 13 destroyers 7 submarines 1 seaplane carrier
1921	1 submarine		1 battleship 4 cruisers 12 destroyers 8 submarines
1922	2 battleships 1 minelayer	2 aircraft carriers	1 aircraft carrier 3 cruisers 10 destroyers 11 submarines
1923			3 cruisers 7 destroyers 6 submarines
1924	5 cruisers 2 destroyers	8 cruisers 1 submarine	1 cruiser 5 destroyers 7 submarines
1925	4 cruisers	2 submarines	3 cruisers 5 destroyers 3 submarines
1926	3 cruisers 6 submarines		2 cruisers 5 destroyers 5 submarines
1927	1 cruiser 9 destroyers 6 submarines 2 sloops		1 aircraft carrier 2 cruisers 5 destroyers 7 submarines
1928	9 destroyers 4 sloops 4 submarines		1 aircraft carrier 1 cruiser 6 destroyers 4 submarines

Table 9 (continued)

<u>Programme or Authorisation Year</u>	<u>British Commonwealth</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>Japan</u>
1929	1 cruiser 5 destroyers 4 sloops 3 submarines	1 aircraft carrier 14 cruisers 3 submarines	3 cruisers 5 destroyers 5 submarines 2 minelayers
1930	3 cruisers 9 destroyers 4 sloops 3 submarines		4 destroyers 3 submarines
1931	3 cruisers 9 destroyers 4 sloops 3 submarines		4 destroyers
1932	3 cruisers 9 destroyers 4 sloops 3 submarines		4 cruisers 4 destroyers 4 submarines 1 minelayer
1933	3 cruisers 9 destroyers 5 sloops 3 submarines	2 aircraft carriers 4 cruisers 19 destroyers 4 submarines	1 aircraft carrier 3 destroyers
1934	1 aircraft carrier 4 cruisers 9 destroyers 6 sloops 3 submarine	7 battleships 1 aircraft carrier 7 cruisers 89 destroyers 37 submarine	1 seaplane carrier 2 destroyers 1 submarine 1 aircraft carrier conversion
1935	3 cruisers 9 destroyers 4 sloops 3 submarines		2 cruisers 2 destroyers 5 submarines
1936	2 battleships 2 aircraft carriers 7 cruisers 18 destroyers 6 sloops 8 submarines		2 destroyers 1 minelayer

Table 9 (continued)

<u>Programme or Authorisation Year</u>	<u>British Commonwealth</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>Japan</u>
1937	3 battleships 2 aircraft carriers 7 cruisers 16 destroyers 6 sloops/escort vessels 7 submarines		1 aircraft carrier 2 cruisers 12 destroyers 4 submarines
1938	1 aircraft carrier 7 cruisers 3 submarines 3 minelayers	3 battleships 2 aircraft carriers 8 cruisers 18 destroyers 10 submarines	1 cruiser 2 seaplane carriers 4 destroyers 3 submarines
1939	1 aircraft carrier 2 cruisers 1 minelayer 16 destroyers 20 escort destroyers 56 corvettes 2 escort vessels (First War Emergency Programme excluded)	1 submarine	1 aircraft carrier 1 cruiser 1 seaplane carrier 4 destroyers 1 minelayer

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